The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contract Rule by Cohn, Sherman L.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1997 
The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-
Contract Rule 
Sherman L. Cohn 
Georgetown University Law Center 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1594 
 
10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Organizations Law Commons 
The. Organizational Client: Attorney-Client
Privilege and the No-Contact Rule
SHERMAN L. CoHN*
A basic issue in the law governing lawyers is the identification of an attorney's
client. Various duties, obligations, and rights arise from the attorney-client
relationship. In the case of the individual who is a client, the answer is relatively
easy. But in the case of the organizational client, the issue becomes more complex
and the answers still are evolving. Indeed, the answer may differ depending on
the legal context in which the question is asked and on the individual values being
served.
In the context of organizational representation, the author believes that
attorneys regularly advise organizations that no employee should speak with any
person about the subject of organizational litigation. They should not speak with
opposing counsel, or with opposing counsel's investigator on any subject,
without counsel for the corporation being present. The very object of this kind of
adivce is to prevent information from reaching the other side. There is no rule on
which this attitude is based. But neither is there a rule that requires corporate
employees to talk.
The restricted contact with employees clearly is designed to protect the
corporate client and to assist counsel in prevailing on behalf of his or her
corporate client. One way of accomplishing this result is for the corporate
authorities to announce that corporate counsel represents all employees of the
corporation in the matter and to urge all employees to speak with corporate
counsel in confidence. This too is relatively common.
1
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. in Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
1954; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 1957; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center 1960. The
author is grateful for the first-rate work of Alexander P. Steffan, J.D./M.B.A., 1999, Georgetown University,
who did the initial hard digging and analysis on the Attorney-Client Privilege section of the paper, demonstrat-
ing the viability of the topic. The author also acknowledges the hard work and great patience of the Editorial
Board, especially Cynthia Hyland, of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics.
1. As has been stated by Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the reporter of the Kutak Commission: "The legal
profession adheres to a 'basic narrative, sustained over two centuries,' that celebrates loyalty to one's client as
the essence of legal representation, and the bar attempts to preserve that image of itself 'notwithstanding
pervasive changes in American society and the profession itself'." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal
Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991). Professor Hazard recounts Lord Brougham's famous quote in defense
of Queen Caroline:
"[An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is
his client. To save that client.., is his first and only duty; and ... he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others .... [H]e must go on reckless of
consequences [to all others and his country]." Id.
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But all of this begs the questions: Is it right? Does it lead to justice? Is such an
attitude imbedded in the law that controls the conduct of counsel? Should it be?
The other side of that coin, of course, concerns the ethical obligation of
counsel for other persons, whether or not they are opposing parties in litigation or
are involved in transactional negotiations. Can counsel for such other parties
approach and interview corporate employees who are willing to talk? Or is that
an ethical breach of a rule against contact of a person who is already represented
by counsel?
2
These issues are closely connected to the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine in the corporate setting. When corporate counsel obtains a
statement from a corporate employee, is that statement protected under the
privilege or as attorney work product? Or, in a litigation setting, can such a
statement be discovered by the opposing side?
The implications of these issues are presented starkly in the litigation surround-
ing a malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and physicians, in which a child was
permanently disabled as a result of an incident during a surgical procedure.
Shortly after the incident, hospital counsel had a nurse paralegal interview three
nurses and a scrub technician, all operating room witnesses who were employees
of the hospital.4 The paralegal prepared summaries of the interviews. 5 Two years
later, when these witnesses were deposed by plaintiff's counsel, none could recall
anything about the incident. 6 When plaintiff's counsel sought the interview
summaries, hospital counsel objected on the ground of the attorney-client
privilege.7 When the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the application of the
privilege, the summaries were turned over and the observations of those wit-
nesses were able to be utilized to arrive at as close to a just decision as possible.8
Once again, what if the court had held that the privilege applied?
The implications of these issues are also presented starkly in the litigation a
generation ago between two large corporations: Xerox and IBM. As is well
known, Xerox developed the first practical photocopier to reach the market. A
few years later, IBM began marketing a photocopier in competition with Xerox.
Xerox sued, accusing IBM of using Xerox's trade secrets that one or more of the
IBM employees had obtained and that IBM was not entitled to use in the
development of a photocopier.9 Just prior to the institution of the suit in 1970, and
in anticipation of that litigation, IBM counsel interviewed and obtained written
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 4.2 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
3. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).




8. Id. at 880.
9. Xerox Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
[Vol. 10:739
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENT
statements from thirty-seven IBM employees who may have had access to Xerox
trade secrets to ascertain the flow of that information through IBM, and to
ascertain whether any of the trade secrets had been used in connection with
IBM's development of its photocopier.'0 Counsel for Xerox thereafter deposed
twenty-three of the thirty-seven and found that not one of them had any memory
of the pertinent facts. " Xerox then sought discovery of all of the statements taken
by IBM counsel.' 2 The court held that, as for the twenty-three who had been
interviewed and had no memory, Xerox had satisfied the inability to obtain the
substantial equivalent by alternate means" prong of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4), and thus had overcome the qualified work-product protec-
tion, 13 but sent Xerox counsel back to depose the other fourteen before their
statements could be obtained.1 4 Xerox then deposed ten of the remaining
fourteen, with the same results.' 5 The judge said that was enough and ordered the
production of all fourteen statements. ' 6 The case was settled soon thereafter.
17
In this example, as far as the official record shows, Xerox made no attempt to
contact IBM employees informally, but took the much more expensive route of
deposing each of them. Obviously in the presence of IBM counsel, not one of the
twenty-three IBM employees had any memory of the situation. IBM counsel
fought to keep Xerox counsel from seeing the statements that these employees
had given to IBM counsel. The court decided the issue under the work-product
doctrine, 18 which, at best, is a qualified privilege. If the court had decided the
issue under the Attorney-Client privilege and had decided that the privilege
barred Xerox counsel from seeing the statements, the results would have been
that the information apparently quite relevant (certainly important enough for
IBM counsel to fight for years to keep it away from Xerox counsel) would have
been kept quiet. This result, of course, would have worked to the advantage of
IBM, but would it have led to a just result?
The American Law Institute (ALI) in its still unfinished Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers19 is now weighing in on these issues as applied to
organizations, and particularly corporations. This paper details the development
of the issues as they have unfolded historically and makes clear that where we are
at the moment is not where we have always been. It then examines the position of
the Restatement, as put forth in its latest draft. The paper then comes back to
10. Id. at 375.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 376.
14. Id. at 382.
15. Xerox Corp. v. International gus. Mach. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
16. Id.
17. Peter J. Schuyten, Information Bank Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1978, at DI.
18. Xerox, 79 F.R.D. at 8.
19. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb2 ° and Xerox v. IBM2 to test whether the ALl
approach is consonant with reaching a just result.
The issues must be approached by asking the significant question: Who is the
attorney's client? The early development of our legal principles has focused on
the individual. The modem corporation, and its broad application and uniform
laws, did not exist two hundred years ago. And the partnership and the unincorpo-
rated association, though in existence, were not recognized as legal beings.
As the organizational structure became more of a factor in society, the law
needed to adjust. This evolution can be seen, for example, in the law of
jurisdiction as applied to a corporation. At first, a corporation was deemed to exist
only in the state of incorporation and thus it could be sued only there.2 The law
evolved to recognize that a corporation can exist outside of the state of
incorporation, but it looked for some tangible sign of existence that implied a
long duration or permanency before acknowledging that existence; e.g., an office,
a factory, a warehouse, the entry of a contract, the "doing" of business.23 Finally,
in 1945, the law recognized that a corporation can be sued wherever it transacts
any one act of business or its agent conmits any one tort or action that causes
24
some injury.
The same struggle can be seen in the law governing lawyers. That law, too, in
its earliest formation, focused upon the individual, both as the client and as the
attorney. It is only in recent times that, for example, the law firm is recognized as
a subject of the law governing lawyers. The American Bar Association (ABA)
Canons of Professional Ethics25 focused solely upon the individual practitioner,
making no direct reference to law firm practice. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility,26 adopted in 1969, noted that the attorney may have "associ-
ates.", 27 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,28 adopted in 1983, for the first
time deals directly with the law firm and certain relationships within the firm.29
The same evolution that we noted with the law firm also has occurred with the
20. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
21. Xerox Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 524 (1839) (holding that a corporation may sue an
individual in another state but the corporation only exists within the state in which it was chartered).
23. See Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) (holding that a railroad
corporation, which did not own property within a state, could not be held to be doing business within that state
merely because its cars were moved through the state by a second carrier).
24. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.").
25. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETtucs, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908.
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSrBILITY (1970) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
27. Cf MODEL CODE DR 4-101(d), 7-107(J), EC 4-2, 4-5 (recognizing "partners" as well as "associates").
28. MODEL RuLEs OFPROFESStONAL Co'Nucr (1983).
29. See MODEL RULES Rule 5.1,5.2 (focusing respectively on the responsibilities of a supervising lawyer and
on the duties of a subordinate attorney).
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corporation. No ABA Canon of Ethic deals with the lawyer's relationship with
the corporation as such. The Model Code raises the matter, but solely as an
aspirational ethical consideration. 30 The Model Rules, on the other hand, focus
directly upon this relationship as a part of black-letter law.
31
More specifically, this paper focuses upon two aspects of this more general
problem:32 (1) the attorney-client privilege and (2) the rule, now found in Model
Rule 4.2, that a lawyer is not to communicate directly with another person whom
the lawyer "knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter" except
with the knowledge and consent of the other lawyer.33 The question common to
the two is: Who is the client in the organizational setting? Unfortunately, the
answer to this question is not uniform from state to state.34 And recently the
United States Supreme Court weighed in with its views applicable to federal
question matters in federal court, so that even within the federal court system
itself the answer may very well differ,35 depending on whether the substantive
issue, in the context of which the question arises, is to be determined by federal or
state law.36
There is now an attempt to arrive at a unified answer to this question. For the
past decade, the ALI has been drafting a Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers (the Restatement). The ALI is attempting to put forth a coherent
doctrine, based upon experience and reason, that will bring consistency to this
area of the law.
To evaluate the ALI's efforts and to understand the impact of its proposals, it is
critical to review the history of the attorney-client privilege as applied to
30. MODEL CODEEC 5-18.
31. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13.
32. Another issue concerning the identity of the client in the corporate setting arises where a corporation has
subsidiary, parent, or sibling corporations. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-396 (1995) (defining the client for purposes of Model Rule 4.2); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) (discussing the definition of a client among affiliated corporations for
purposes of identifying conflicts of interest).
33. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
34. See UNF. R. Evm. 502(a)(2) (defining the organizational client for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege as persons who either have the authority to act on advice rendered to the client organization or who
make or receive confidential communications in the course of their employment); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (defining the client for purposes of Model Rule 4.2 as
"employees with managerial responsibility, those whose act or omission may be imputed to the organization
and those whose statements may constitute admissions by the organization with respect to the matter in
question"). Compare Consolidated Coal v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (IIl. 1982) (holding that the
control-group test strikes a reasonable balance on the question of attorney-client privilege) with Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1995) (holding for the subject-matter test while reasoning that it
more completely addresses the problem of a corporate privilege).
35. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (rejecting a narrow control-group test and refusing to
use a subject-matter test, instead using a case-by-case approach).
36. See Julie Elizabeth Rice, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersection of
Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 175 (noting the divergence of Illinois and federal law and the
uncertainty that this divergence creates for lawyers in federal court).
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organizations, generally the corporation. The ALl proposals are firmly rooted in
this history, but make some significant departures. Therefore, the first section of
this paper will explore how the privilege, as applied to corporations, developed in
the United States. This leads to the significant Supreme Court decision of Upjohn
v. United States,3 7 an important benchmark in the development of the law. While
Upjohn has not been adopted by all of the states, which has seeded confusion in
the federal courts, it is the basis of the approach adopted by the ALI. Thus,
Upjohn furnishes the jump off point for an examination of the Restatement,
which is the second major section of the paper. Focus is then turned to the rule
that a lawyer is not to contact directly an adverse client who is represented by
counsel, 38 the so-called anti-contact or no-contact rule. The significant question
again concerns who is to be included in the concept of client for the purpose of
this rule when the client is an organization. It is the thesis of this paper that the
attorney-client privilege and the anti-contact rule should be viewed and evaluated
together, rather than in isolation. Moreover, this amalgam must be evaluated
critically in terms of the reality of organizational psychology.
This paper concludes that even the compromise arrived at by the ALI - a
broader attorney-client privilege with a narrower no-contact rule - perverts
justice. As we saw in Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb,39 when questioned by
counsel opposing the organization for which they work, employees often "for-
get" what they told organizational counsel a short time before. 40 Thus, permis-
sion to contact and talk with employees does not always lead to disclosure of
relevant information. And, if the attorney-client privilege is used to hide com-
pletely what the employee knows, justice in any objective sense cannot prevail.
While it is good for organizational counsel to be able to question employees and
fully investigate, this paper concludes that any good is outweighed by the
injustice that occurs when facts are hidden from view. Admittedly there is value
in the confidentiality required when a client directly seeks legal advice, which
justifies the attorney-client privilege; however, this paper concludes that the
expansion of the attorney-client privilege, while perhaps justified in the investiga-
tory setting of Upjohn, is unjustified when applied by the Restatement to broader
settings.
I. A HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. INTRODUCTION
The courts have never had any doubt that corporations should enjoy the
37. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
38. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
39. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
40. Id. at 873.
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benefits of an attorney-client privilege.4' Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the corporate attorney-client privilege as early as 1915.42
However, the point has been argued in academia and in at least one court
decision.43 A quick look at the competing arguments is instructive as we explore
why it has been so difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition of "client" in this
setting.'
There are two competing visions for the relationship between a corporation
and its lawyers.45 The first views corporations as wholly distinct from natural
persons in their rights and attributes and is reluctant to bestow the rights of
natural persons upon corporations.4 6 Under this vision, as argued by Chief Judge
Campbell in Radiant Burners v. American Gas Association4 7 and some academ-
ics, 4 8 organizations are the creation of state government and therefore should not
receive fundamental personal rights such as the privilege against self-
41. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319-320 n.7 (7th Cir. 1963) [hereinafter
Radiant Burners 11] (citing cases recognizing the corporate attomey-client privilege going back to 1885 in the
United States and 1833 in England).
42. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (assuming that
corporations could claim the benefit of the privilege even though no issue of its applicability had been raised).
Compare Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. I11. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d
314 (7th Cir. 1963) [hereinafter Radiant Burners )] (holding by Chief Judge Campbell that the privilege, for the
first time, does not apply to corporations) with City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483,484 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (holding by Judge Kirkpatrick that the privilege applies to corporations because most
courts had joined the Supreme Court in assuming its application). The Supreme Court twenty years later
reiterated, "[Tihis Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and the
Government does not contest the general proposition." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citing United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915)).
43. E.g., DAVID LuBAN & DEBORAH L. RHODE, LEGAL ETHICS 276-77 (2d ed., 1995); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
& JUSTICE 217-34 (1988); James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients-Paradox or Public Policy, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 323-25, 376 (1963); see also, e.g., Note, The
Applicability of the Attorney Client Privilege to a Corporation-The Current Evolution of an "Accepted" Rule of
Law, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 382 (1963) (discussing the potential impact of Radiant Burners I and the necessity of
an organizational privilege); Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REV. 91, 276-77 (1981)
(arguing that high cost and uncertain benefits of the privilege make it socially wasteful). The one decision
known to this author holding that the privilege does not apply is that of Chief Judge Campbell in Radiant
Burners 1, 207 F. Supp. at 771.
44. David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 956 (1956)
(pointing out the many difficult questions that result from giving a personal privilege to an organization).
45. The author is indebted to Dean John Sexton for the development of this thesis. See John Sexton, A
Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982)
(discussing the idea of two competing visions for the corporate attorney-client privilege at the time of the
Upjohn decision).
46. See Radiant Burners 1, 207 F. Supp. at 771 (arguing that the corporation should not have any privileges),
rev'd, Radiant Burners 11, 320 F2d at 314.
47. Id.
48. See LUBAN & RHODE, supra note 43, at 276-77 (arguing that the theoretical justifications for the privilege
are insubstantial); LuBAN, supra note 43, at 217-34 (discussing the absence of theoretical justification for the
organizational privilege); Gardner, supra note 43, at 323-25, 376 (stating that the organizational privilege was a
mistake in legal history).
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incrimination or the attorney-client privilege, 49 at least not without specific
statutory action.50 Further, it is urged, as corporations are major societal actors
capable of wreaking much havoc when they go "bad," their activities need to be
monitored and illegalities exposed and punished to encourage behavior beneficial
to society.51 Proponents of this view also argue that corporations need no
encouragement to speak with their lawyers because the special legal duties
imposed on organizations require them to speak with attorneys on a regular basis
regardless of the existence of a privilege.52 With the exception of Chief Judge
Campbell's decision in Radiant Burners,53 however, a total rejection of a
corporate attorney-client privilege has not found favor in the courts, as the
corporate attorney-client privilege is now accepted by the United States Supreme
Court and by all states.54
The second vision is a "voluntary compliance" model of corporate behavior.5
It has gained currency in response to both the complex set of laws and regulations
that now govern corporations and the limited enforcement resources available for
enforcing these laws and regulations.56 This model views corporations as
institutions dedicated to complying with the law, where self-monitoring is critical
to such compliance. 57 To encourage this self-monitoring activity, corporations
should be given a broad attorney-client privilege to protect and encourage
self-evaluation and consultation with counsel, which will lead to better voluntary
law enforcement.58 The United States Supreme Court utilized just this rationale
in 1981 in deciding Upjohn v. United States59 when it ruled that the attorney-
client privilege is broad enough to cover information collected by counsel from
all employees of the corporation questioned during an internal investigation of
possible violations of law.
60
49. See CHARLES L. WoLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 6.5.3, at 283-84 (1986) ("[A]rguments [for the
corporate privilege] based on human dignity are irrelevant. The corporation as an entity has no legal or moral
claims to dignity. The humans who act as agents of the corporation are entitled to such dignity, but individually
they are not the client .... ").
50. See Radiant Burners 1, 207 F. Supp. at 773 ("[A] corporation [that] is a mere creature of the state and not
a natural entity should not, without legislation, be afforded a privilege historically created only for natural
persons.").
51. E.g., Sexton, supra note 45, at 463-470; Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 43, at 276-277.
52. Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 43, at 276-78.
53. Radiant Burners 1, 207 F. Supp. at 771.
54. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding for the existence of a privilege). In
addition, the Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted in some form in every state allow for a corporate
attorney-client privilege. UNw. R. Evm. 502. Finally, even Radiant Burners I was reversed by the Seventh
Circuit. Radiant Burners I1, 320 F.2d at 314.
55. Sexton, supra note 45, at 468-470.
56. Id.; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
57. Sexton, supra note 45, at 468-470; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
58. Sexton, supra note 45, at 468-470; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
59. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
60. Id. at 393. Professor Sexton points out that the IRS argued that the Supreme Court should have adopted a
narrow attorney-client privilege, because the IRS needed access to more information in order to better enforce
[Vol. 10:739
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With the force of the Supreme Court behind it, the "voluntary compliance"
model is now widely, but not universally, accepted. The battle persists as to the
circumstances under which the privilege applies to communications between
counsel and employees and agents of large modem corporations. 6' The two
different visions reflect the positions being taken. Clearly, if one starts from the
"voluntary compliance" model, there is an incentive to build in as wide an
attorney-client privilege as possible, to encourage counsel and the employees and
agents to have candid conversations.62 But if one starts from the premise that
corporations will not comply voluntarily and must be closely monitored, then the
privilege's application becomes begrudging, and the tendency is one of limiting
the privilege upon some rational boundary.
63
One such rational boundary for the narrower model is a focus on the attorney in
two capacities: one, in the attorney's advisory role, giving advice to the client as
to what the law permits and prohibits;64 the other, in the attorney's litigation and
transaction-enabling roles, looking to the client to direct counsel on the objec-
tives of the representation and to make decisions on major matters such as
whether to make or accept a settlement offer. With these two capacities as the sole
focus, a rational line can be drawn limiting the privilege to conversations
between counsel and corporate personnel in the upper corporate echelons. But if
the focus is broader, to include a role in internal investigations to ensure that
corporate employees are adhering to the requirements of law, then the narrower
model has severe limitations.
When a matter reaches litigation, the party opposing the corporation has an
interest in discovering as much as possible, looking for damaging evidence. If
there is no corporate attorney-client privilege, then, of course, the opposing party
may discover all that was said to the corporation's lawyer. This basic rejection of
the corporate attorney-client privilege has drawn virtually no support and is, for
all practical purposes, one of pure academic discussion.65
If one posits a corporate attorney-client privilege, then it becomes of great
the law against Upjohn and other corporations. Thus, the IRS had the first vision of the corporation developed
above, namely that enforcement of these major societal actors cannot be hindered by granting privileges to
organizations that have numerous incentives to consult with their attorneys. The Supreme Court, however, had
the second vision, based on corporate voluntary compliance, and rejected the narrower version of the privilege.
Sexton, supra note 45, at 470-71.
61. See Admiral Ins. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F2d 486 (9th Cir. 1988); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994). Interestingly, Chief Judge Campbell noted that the fact that a corporation
is monolithic undermines the idea that it can have a privilege at all. He reasoned that a privilege implies a bond
of secrecy between the lawyer and the client and that the bond of secrecy cannot exist in the modern corporation
where there are many individuals involved. Radiant Burners 1, 207 F. Supp. at 774.
62. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (arguing the importance of encouraging employee honesty); Sexton, supra
note 45, at 470.
63. Sexton, supra note 45, at 470.
64. "About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists of telling the client he is a damn fool." I PimiP C.
JEssup, ELniU RooT 133 (1938).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49 for such a discussion.
1997]
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significance as to how far that privilege extends. If for the purpose of the
privilege the concept of "client" is construed narrowly, then conversations
between counsel and other constituents of the corporate entity will be discover-
able. The battle is fought as well concerning the application of the privilege to a
former officer, director, or other employee of the corporate entity. Thus, it can be
seen that the issue is of great practical importance in modem litigation.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO COMPETING TESTS:
CONTROL GROUP VERSUS SUBJECT MATTER
The classic judicial definition of the attorney-client privilege was laid down by
Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.6 6 Judge
Wyzanski permitted a corporation to claim the attorney-client privilege, stating,
without supplying any analysis, that the privilege applies to "information
furnished [to the attorney] by an officer or employee" of the corporation.67 In so
doing, Judge Wyzanski ignored dicta in Hickman v. Taylor,6 8 that statements of
lower-level employees are not within the privilege.69
The starting point of analysis is Judge Kirkpatrick's decision in City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.70 Judge Kirkpatrick adopted and
applied what has come to be known as the "control-group test":
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he
is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply.
7 1
Judge Kirkpatrick developed this test because of his dissatisfaction with the
66. 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) ("It follows that in so far as these letters to or from independent
lawyers were prepared to solicit or give an opinion on law or legal services, such parts of them are privileged as
contain, or have opinions based on, information furnished by an officer or employee of the defendant in
confidence and without the presence of third persons.").
67. Id.
68. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
69. Id. at 508. While discussing the availability of the statements of employees taken by the employer's
lawyer as against a claim of attorney-client privilege, Justice Murphy stated, -For present purposes, it suffices
to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from
a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation .. ." Id. See also City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ("I cannot help feeling that he [Judge
Wyzanski in United Shoe Machinery] is in conflict with Hickman v. Taylor."). It is worth noting that the tugs in
Hickman were not owned by a corporation. The clients of the interviewing lawyer were being represented as
individuals. And although the witnesses were employees, the situation is not directly analogous to a corporate
client. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
70. 210 F Supp. at 483.
71. Id. at 485.
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alternatives. 72 He dismissed any test that relied on the rank of the corporate
employee as too nebulous, writing, "in corporate terminology the same title does
not always mean the same thing.",73 After he dismissed, without comment, an
approach that would turn on "whether the acts of the employee which he
disclosed to the lawyer in his communication were acts for which the corporation
would be responsible,", 74 he offered his own test.75 Under his test, a communica-
tion between a corporate official and counsel would be privileged if the official
sought legal advice on behalf of the corporation or directed the counsel in some
legal action, reasoning that, because a corporation could only speak through an
employee, any communication of a corporate official made as part of his duties
was the communication of the corporate client.76 If that communication was
made while seeking legal advice on behalf of the corporation or if the communi-
cation sought to direct counsel, then that communication should be privileged.77
The control-group test clearly satisfies the basic rationale for the privilege of
encouraging communication between the client, here the corporation, and its
lawyers. Its focus, however, is on decision makers and those who personify the
corporation, ensuring that the highest levels of management and the board of
directors are included. However, it does not cover those agents or employees who
have no decision-making authority or authority to direct or control counsel, but
nonetheless are closely involved with the matter for which the corporate
attorneys have been retained or whose actions have given rise to or could give
rise to corporate liability.
7 8
The control-group test also has the potential problem of being unclear. For any
given situation those "in a position to control ... any action" may shift greatly
within a corporation. On some matters, only the highest officers of the corpora-
tion may make decisions, and they must deal with counsel in making those
decisions. In others, it may be a department head or a branch manager who has
the power to decide and to deal with local counsel in arriving at those decisions.
This can lead to uncertainty and requires counsel and corporate officers to act
upon their prognostication as to whom a court will later hold to have been
included in the control group for the particular transaction or controversy and,
thus, whose statements to counsel are privileged.79







78. Id. ("In all other cases the employee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to enable the
latter to advise those in the corporation to have the authority to act ... ").
79. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (stating that lower courts interpret the
control-group standard inconsistently).
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client privilege. Conversations between the corporate attorney and employees
who fall outside of the control group are not covered by the privilege at all. This
may inhibit corporate counsel from making an intensive internal investigation
into possible violations of law by corporate employees who fall outside the
control group, for anything that such an employee tells the attorney is protected,
at most, by the qualified work-product privilege and not by the more absolute
privilege applicable to conversations between client and attorney.80
Westinghouse8' put into play the issue of how far the corporate attorney-client
privilege extends. While its ruling was adopted by many federal courts, several
refused to follow Judge Kirkpatrick's lead. The key case to break with the
Westinghouse control-group test was Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.
83
Harper & Row found the control-group test wanting because it excluded from the
privilege counsel's conversations with lower echelon employees, treating them as
mere witnesses. 84 The Seventh Circuit felt that the confidences of such employ-
ees deserved protection because even the lowest level employee acts on behalf of
the corporation and may possess information vital to the legal matter under
investigation. 85 The Harper & Row test became known as the subject-matter test:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his commu-
nication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the
corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment.
86
This broad test has three major components: 1) the employee must make the
communication at the direction of his or her superior; 2) the communication must
be on a "subject matter" about which the corporation is seeking legal advice
from, or giving instruction to, counsel; and 3) the subject matter must concern the
employee's work duties. Thus, all interviews done in the course of an internal
audit or investigation would be covered because any employee interviewed by or
on behalf of corporate counsel at the direction of the employee's superiors on a
80. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 445, 508 (1947) (pointing out that the privilege did not extend to the
witnesses in the case).
81. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
82. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding for a control-group test in a patent
case); United States v. Amarada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding for a control-group
test in a case involving the enforcement of summonses); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d
Cir. 1979) (holding for control-group test after considering all alternatives); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock, 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975) (holding for a control-group test because it was the
easiest to apply).
83. 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
84. Id. at 491.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 492.
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legal matter connected with his or her employment would fall within the
privilege. The Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row opened up this issue, and in the
next eleven years a significant minority of the federal courts that considered the
issue adopted some form of the subject-matter test.8 7
This test expands the privilege beyond the control-group test in two ways.
First, it covers more individuals than the control-group test because it applies not
just to upper management but to all employees in the right circumstances.
Second, it applies not just to management's obtaining advice from counsel or
giving instructions to counsel, but to all investigatory work done by counsel. It
very clearly allows the possibility that information uncovered through an internal
investigation by counsel is privileged. If carried to its logical conclusion, the
organizational privilege is not just a narrow functional doctrine to encourage
discussions between management and the company's lawyers over the law's
requirements, but it should permit the lawyer, under cover of the privilege, to
enter into discussions with any employee, whether for the purpose of obtaining
information from that employee or to furnish that employee advice on legal
matters pertaining to his or her position.
The other major impact of this test is the result of the unusual timing of Harper
& Row88 and its disposition by the Supreme Court. Harper & Row created a
circuit conflict during a time in which an advisory committee was drafting the
Federal Rules of Evidence.89 Harper & Row was affirmed by an equally divided
Supreme Court.90 Shortly thereafter, the Rules Advisory Committee's proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence were approved by the Supreme Court.91 These
proposed rules adopted an unusually vague rule in the area of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, and provided virtually no assistance in its commen-
tary.92 It seems reasonably clear that the generality of the proposed rule can be
87. Sexton, supra note 45, at 451 n.39; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368,
372 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456-57 (N.D. Ill.
1974), affidmem., 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425,428 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 1972 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 47 (N.D. 111. 1971).
88. Harper Row, 423 F.2d at 487.
89. See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding for a control group test).
90. Harper Row, 400 U.S. at 348.
91. 120 CONG. REc. H12, 253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
92. Supreme Court Advisory Committee Note (subd. (a)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972)). The Supreme
Court's proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates included a detailed,
thirteen rule, Article V that covered all privileges. Nonetheless, proposed Rule 503(a), covering the attorney-
client privilege, did not define "representative of the client," preferring to leave it "to resolution by decision on
a case-by-case basis." Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Advisory Comment Note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972). In the end, Congress did not accept any of Article V as proposed and reduced its
contents to the current Rule 501. 120 CONG. REc. H12, 253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974). Rule 501 reads "the
privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and
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attributed to the unsettled nature of the law in the Supreme Court at the time.9 3
After these conflicting tests were in place, and without a clear Supreme Court
decision or guidance from the Federal Rules of Evidence, other courts attempted
further variations. The most notable attempt, by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,94 added to the subject-matter test the requirement
that "the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because
of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.", 95 Thus in the Eighth
Circuit, the full test has five requirements:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2)
the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so the corporation could secure legal
advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents.
96
The resulting state of the law was, needless to say, confusing. While it was
agreed that there was an attorney-client privilege for corporations, the scope of
that privilege was unclear. Circuits and district courts were in direct conflict on
the matter, the Supreme Court was divided, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
merely deferred to this muddled common law. In this context Upjohn97 was heard
and decided.
C. UPJOHN V. UNITED STATES: THE SUBJECT-MATrER TEST
The facts of Upjohn are familiar. Upjohn's general counsel was informed that
overseas subsidiaries might have made illegal payments to foreign government
officials in aid of securing business.98 The general counsel, along with outside
counsel, prepared a detailed questionnaire that was sent to all overseas managers
experience." FED. R. EVID. 501. See KENNETH REEDEM & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 128, 133 (Michie Co. 1975) (reprinting the congressional reports on Rule 501).
93. As is developed herein, a further complicating factor is that portion of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 that
requires federal courts to apply the state law on privilege wherever state law supplies the rule of decision; for
example, (but not limited to) diversity cases. FED. R. EVID. 501.
94. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), affd en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1978).
95. Id. See also In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the privilege
protects communications so long as they were intended to be confidential).
96. Diversified Indus., 572.E2d at 609.
97. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (decided three years after Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d
596, and ten years after Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Decker 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by equally
divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)).
98. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
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as a part of a letter signed by Upjohn's chairman of the board.99 The letter advised
the managers that the Chairman had asked the general counsel to conduct an
investigation concerning any such payments, that as a part of that investigation
the managers were to answer the questionnaires, that the questionnaires were to
be returned to the general counsel, and that the investigation was to be treated as
"highly confidential.' ° Based on the results of the investigation, Upjohn
voluntarily reported to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") that illegal pay-
ments had been made.'' In response, the IRS began its own investigation by
requesting numerous documents, including the questionnaires. 0 2 Upjohn refused
to turn over the questionnaires on the ground of attorney-client privilege.'o 3
Factually, Upjohn fit perfectly into the "voluntary compliance" rationale and
the subject-matter test." o First, this was a matter Upjohn voluntarily explored to
find out if its employees were in compliance with the prohibition on payments to
foreign officials. Upjohn also voluntarily revealed to the IRS the violations that it
had found. Second, it was a clear match with the Harper & Row 10 5 test: 1) the
questionnaires were filled out by corporate employees at the request of their
superior, 2) the questionnaires inquired into a matter on which Upjohn was
seeking legal advice, 3) the payments being investigated were made in connec-
tion with pursuit of Upjohn's business, and 4) the employees from whom the
information was obtained were involved in that aspect of the corporate busi-
ness. 1
0 6
The opposing side, of course, would see the matter quite differently. From its
focus, the investigation was done from a fear of being caught and a desire to be
proactive in forestalling government investigation and prosecution.I17 Under this
view, with or without the privilege, Upjohn would have performed this very
investigation; all the privilege would accomplish would be to allow Upjohn to
hide the full extent of its wrongdoing.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, specifically rejected the control-
group test and took the "voluntary compliance" view.10 8 However, the majority
did not expressly adopt the subject-matter test, with or without any of its
99. Id.
100. Id. at 387.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 383.
104. See Sexton, supra note 45, at 469 ("The voluntary compliance model of corporate behavior flows
naturally from the facts of the Upjohn case.").
105. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
106. Id. at 491.
107. Sexton, supra note 45, at 497 n.107. See generally Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 43,
at 276-77; Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424
(1970). An internal compliance program is recognized under the federal Sentencing Guidelines as a factor to
reduce a sentence that would otherwise be imposed. Infra note 315.
108. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 384 (1981).
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modifications. Instead, the Court took what has been called by Professor Sexton a
"functional" approach.'9 The functional approach embraces no test and matches
the vision of voluntary compliance as the purpose of the privilege. Professor
Sexton describes the Court's functional approach as follows: "[The Court] asked
whether application of the privilege in circumstances of the kind at issue would
enhance the flow of information to corporate counsel regarding issues about
which corporations seek legal advice."' 0 Justice Rehnquist's rationale for
having a corporate privilege was a clear vision of voluntary compliance:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."'
The Court accepted the premises that corporations need the privilege in order
for their employees to be encouraged to communicate fully with corporate
lawyers, that corporations are active and voluntary followers of the law, and that
such compliance goes beyond the threat of being caught." 2 The Court's opinion
clearly supports the idea that corporations need privacy to the extent afforded by
the attorney-client privilege to comply with laws, and that internal investigations
should be protected as a corporate effort to monitor compliance. 13
Without actually saying so, Justice Rehnquist did in fact use the subject-matter
test. The facts that Justice Rehnquist cited in support of the privilege match the
key elements of Harper & Row. Upjohn's counsel were acting as counsel, at the
direction of corporate superiors, gathering information on important legal matters
within the employment duties of those interviewed from people who knew that
was the purpose of the interview, and who were instructed by their corporate
superior to cooperate fully in the investigation on a confidential basis. 114 This is
the subject-matter test.' 15
Yet, the Court did not articulate a test. There is no doubt that their restraint was
deliberate. The Court stated explicitly that it did not "undertake to draft a set of
rules [that] should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any such
approach would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501." 116
109. Sexton, supra note 45, at 462. See Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993) ("We think
an approach that focuses solely upon the status of the communicator fails to adequately meet the objectives
sought to be served by the attorney-client privilege. We take a functional approach.").
110. Sexton, supra note 45, at 462.
111. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
112. Sexton, supra note 45, at 463.
113. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (holding that Upjohn was making an effort to comply with the laws and
obtain legal advice).
114. Id. at 395.
115. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970).
116. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396 (quoting the Senate Report: "[Tihe recognition of a privilege based on a
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D. BEYOND UPJOHN
While Upjohn'1 7 made it more or less clear what the Supreme Court thought of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting, its refusal to articulate a test
and its reliance on Federal Rule of Evidence 501 left lower federal courts on their
own to develop a meaningful test within the doctrine laid down by Upjohn. As
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part, feared, the result is "continuing
uncertainty and confusion... [with] inherent dissonance. ,, 118
Sixteen years after Upjohn, two answers seem to have been formulated. The
first is a literal interpretation of Upjohn and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: the
privilege should be determined "by the principles of the common law in light of
reason and experience" on a case-by-case basis, without any standard. i 9 The
second is that the Court's reasoning in Upjohn clearly favored the subject-matter
test and was a tacit endorsement of either the Harper & Row' 20 or the Diversified
Industriesl21 formulation of that test.
The Ninth Circuit favored a literal interpretation of Upjohn when it decided
Admiral Insurance Co. v. U.S. District Court.122 Under Upjohn, the Ninth Circuit
said, "each case must be evaluated to determine whether application of the
privilege would further its underlying purpose" to encourage attorney-client
communications. 2 3 The Ninth Circuit found that Upjohn "stands for the propo-
sition that [where] the advantages of preserving the privilege outweigh the
inescapable disadvantages of the resultant secrecy" the privilege applies. 124 The
Ninth Circuit specifically interpreted the Upjohn holding to apply the privilege
"to communications by any corporate employee regardless of position when the
communications concern matters within the scope of the employee's corporate
confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis" S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974)).
Thus, section 501 provides that, except where "[sitate law provides the rule of decision," privilege "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience." Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part in the Upjohn opinion, disagreed with
the majority's refusal to articulate a standard. He would have rejected the control-group test and adopted the
subject-matter test articulated in Harper & Row and Diversified Industries. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402-04 (citing
Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491).
117. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
118. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 404.
119. Id. at 397. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Ct., 881 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1988)
(applying Upjohn by analogy), LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (applying same);
United States v. Mobil, 149 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (choosing to avoid application of a rigid test and
instead to evaluate whether the application of the privilege would further its purpose); Eglin Federal Credit
Union v. McKelvey, 91 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stressing the Supreme Court's adoption of a case-by-case
approach); Boyer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.R.D. 687 (D. Kan. 1995) (acknowledging the absence of a
test in Upjohn, and reasoning based on Upjohn principles).
120. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 487.
121. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
122. 881 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1988).
123. Id. at 1492.
124. Id.
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duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable
the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation." ' 25 This "non-test" test
seems to be a presumption of privilege for the corporation for any communica-
tion concerning an employee's work asked for by the corporation. At least four
district court cases use standards similar to Admiral. 
126
The other view of Upjohn 27 is neatly summarized by the District Court of the
District of Columbia in Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. 128 The District Court simply stated that both Upjohn' 29 and Diversi-
fied Industries 30 are controlling and proceeded to use the Diversified Industries
subject-matter test.13 ' The District Court, stressing that not all communications
made to legal counsel are assumed to be privileged, stated, "[i]t is far too
expansive an interpretation to say that any communication made by any em-
ployee to corporation's legal counsel is prima facie done so for legal advice and
therefore is privileged absent some other showing." ' 32 This formulation seems to
contradict Admiral's emphasis that Upjohn constitutes an endorsement of the
advantages of the privilege, with little, if any, regard for its costs. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the District Court found no privilege. 1
33
Turning to state law, it must be noted that Upjohn clearly is not a constitutional
decision. Thus, each state is free to adopt its own rule. The Supreme Court's
guidance in Upjohn, while totally embraced in some states, was accepted with
modifications in others, and rejected in still others.' 34
The matter is complicated by the fact that in many states this issue is governed
by statute. As promulgated in 1974, Rule 502(a) of the Uniform Rules of
125. Id.
126. E.g., In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v. Mobil, 149
F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1993); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. McKelvey, 91 ER.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Boyer v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.R.D. 687 (D. Kan. 1995).
127. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
128. 672 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C., 1986); see also In re Intl. Systems and Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552
(S.D. Tex. (1981) (finding a test similar to Diversified Industries applicable. The corporate privilege "extends to
those communications to or from the attorney by any employee if the communication concerned matters within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties, the employee was aware he was being questioned in order that the
corporation may obtain legal advice, and the communication was considered highly confidential when made
and has been kept confidential by the company").
129. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
130. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cit. 1977).
131. Independent Petrochemical, 672 F. Supp. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. Consolidated Coal v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982) (rejecting Upjohn and adopting a
control-group test); Fruehauf Trailer Corp. v. Hagelthorn, 528 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (declaring
Upjohn controlling by finding the privilege not warranted by the facts of the case); Command Trans. v. Y.S. Line
(USA) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987) (adopting Upjohn); Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d
1377 (Fla. 1994) (holding Upjohn to be persuasive authority); Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870
(Ariz. 1993) (approving Upjohn but adopting neither a control group or subject matter test).
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Evidence provided for the control-group test. 1 35 And this version was adopted by
several states. 136 Five years after Upjohn, 137 the Uniform Rules of Evidence were
revised to include an optional Rule 502(a) based upon a broad reading of the
rationale of Upjohn.138 Since the 1986 revision, the optional version of Rule
502(a) has been adopted verbatim by six states and partially by at least two
others.1 39 Eighteen states that have adopted the Uniform Rules have chosen to
omit 502(a) entirely, preferring that there be a judicial solution."'4 Of course,
where the issue is resolved by statute and the statute is clear, the room for judicial
adoption of one test over another is limited or non-existent.
The Illinois Supreme Court was one of the first to act in the wake of Upjohn. In
1982, Illinois specifically rejected Upjohn and adopted the control-group test. 141
The court saw the issue as a choice between two clearly different formulations of
the privilege. On one hand were the subject-matter tests, personified by Harper &
Row,' 42 which had been criticized as protecting "too much relevant information
from discovery." 143 On the other was the control-group test, which some courts
thought frustrated the purpose of the privilege by being too narrow. 44 The
Illinois court concluded that the control-group test better balanced the concern
for open discovery and the need for communication between managers and the
corporation's lawyers: 1
45
The control-group test appears to us to strike a reasonable balance by protecting
consultations with counsel by those who are the decision makers or who
substantially influence corporate decisions and by minimizing the amount of
relevant factual material which is immune from discovery.1 4
6
135. The 1974 version of 502(a) is as follows:
(2) A representative of the client is one having authority to obtain professional legal services by a
lawyer, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client.
JOSEPH SALTzBURG, 1 EviDENcE IN AMERICA, ch. 24, at 1 (1994).
136. It was reported in 1994 that eleven states had adopted this version of Uniform Rule 502(a)(2). Id. at 7-8.
By 1996 that number had dropped to six. UNIF. R. EvtD. 502 (amended 1986), 13A U.L.A. 520-29 (1994).
137. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
138. The 1986 option is as follows:
(2) A representative of the client is (i) one having authority to obtain professional legal services by a
lawyer, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client or (ii) any other person
who, for the purpose of effecting legal representation for the client, makes or receives a confidential
communication while acting in the scope of employment for the client.
SALTZBURG, supra, at 2.
139. UNIF. R. EvlD. 502 (amended 1986), 13A U.L.A. 520-29 (1994).
140. UNF. R. EvlD. 502.
141. Consolidated Coal v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (I11. 1982).
142. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
143. Consolidated Coal, 432 N.E.2d at 256.
144. See id. (refraining from questioning the central assumption of the earlier cases that the privilege was
needed to encourage conversations between corporations and their attorneys).
145. Id. at 257.
146. Id.
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In the court's view, these factors outweighed any benefit from a broader test
that would provide an incentive for corporate employees to cooperate fully in
investigations and to consult concerning the corporation's legal obligations. The
court concluded that the control-group test provided all the incentive that was
needed. 1
47
In Fruehauf Trailer Corp. v. Hagelthorn, a Michigan appellate court declared
that Upjohn was "controlling" on the corporate "client side of the attorney-client
relationship." 48 A Massachusetts federal court, sitting in diversity, found no
Massachusetts state case on point. However, the district court held that if
Massachusetts were to decide the issue, it would adopt Upjohn: "Upjohn's legacy
is to encourage ... a focus, in consideration of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context, on whether the application of the privilege in circumstances of
a particular case would foster the flow of information to corporate counsel
regarding issues about which corporations seek legal advice." 149 In essence, this
case construed Upjohn150 similarly to the construction given it by the Ninth
Circuit in Admiral Insurance Co.,'51 in that the rationale followed in Upjohn was
held to serve as a de facto test.
152
Florida, in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Deason,153 found
Upjohn to be "persuasive authority," and adopted a variation of the subject-
matter test. 15 4 The Florida test contains five elements:
1) the communication would not have been made but for the contemplation of
legal services; 2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his or her corporate superior; 3) the superior made the request of
the employee as part of the corporation's effort to secure legal advice or
services; 4) the content of the communication relates to the legal services being
rendered, and 5) the subject matter of the communication is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents. ' 
55
Thus, Southern Bell's conclusion was that Upjohn is to be followed and that
Upjohn adopts a subject-matter test. 56 This puts Southern Bell at odds with those
states that have read Upjohn to abjure any test and, of course, with those states
that have adopted the control-group test.
An interesting variation is that put forth by the Arizona Supreme Court in
147. Id.
148. Fruehauf Trailer Corp. v. Hagelthom, 528 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Command Trans. v. Y.S. Line (USA) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D. Mass. 1987).
150. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
151. Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1481, 1486 (9th Cir. 1988).
152. Id.
153. 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994).





Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb15 7 where Upjohn was given a nod of
approval, particularly for its rejection of the control-group test, but was not
adopted. 58 The test developed in Samaritan follows a different theory from
either the control-group test or the subject-matter test. Samaritan protects under
the privilege two types of communication. 159 First, where an employee institutes
the communication, seeking advice for a matter within the interest of the
corporation, that communication is held to be within the privilege. 160 Where, on
the other hand, the communication is initiated by counsel or by someone else in
the corporation, then the communication with the employee is within the
privilege only if it is the action or inaction of that employee that is the basis of
imputed liability to the corporation based upon the respondeat superior doc-
trine.' 6 ' Samaritan excludes from the privilege all other communications from
employees to corporate counsel, with the probable exception of communications
from the control group. Thus, the standard adopted in Samaritan, though broader
than the control-group test, is narrower than the subject-matter test of Harper &
Row 16 2 and Diversified Industries.1 63 When one compares Samaritan64 with
Upjohn,1 65 however, it is possible to read them consistently, for on the facts the
questionnaires in Upjohn appear to have been addressed solely to those managers
who could have been involved in illegal gift giving. On the other hand, the
Upjohn decision does not declare position a significant factor. 166
The result is that there is no uniformity from court to court. As noted, the
federal courts, while recognizing that the control-group test is not valid in federal
question matters, are not in agreement as to what is valid. And the states, having
more leeway, are in even greater dissonance.
Indeed, when we turn back to the federal courts, we find what should be a
disturbing consequence of the dissonance. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 com-
mands that federal courts use the state law of privilege whenever "state law
157. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
158. Id. at 875.
159. Id. at 876.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 877.
162. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
163. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
164. Samaritan Found., 862 P.2d at 870.
165. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. at 383 (1981).
166. ld. at 395. The Arizona legislature quickly overrode the ruling of the Samaritan Foundation v.
Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (1983), decision the next year, adopting Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 12-2234, B, "any
communication is privileged between an attorney for a corporation, governmental entity, partnership, business,
association or other similar entity or an employer and any employee, agent or member of the entity or employer
regarding acts or omissions of or information obtained from the employee, agent or member if the communica-
tion is either: 1) For the purpose of providing legal advice to the entity or employer or to the employee, agent or
member. 2) For the purpose of obtaining information in order to provide legal advice to the entity or employer or
to the employee, agent or member." ARZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2234 (1994). This is a broader privilege, almost
without limits. Note, The Extent of the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege in Arizona, 36 Aiz. L. REV. 725,
744(1994).
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supplies the rule of decision [pertaining to] an element of a claim or defense..."
in a civil action. 167 Thus, a federal court sitting in federal question is to apply the
federal common law of privilege, whatever that may be in that court, but the same
court sitting in diversity is to apply state law to that issue. And, in a federal
question case in which there are joined state claims under the supplemental
jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. 1367,168 the federal court may be called upon
to apply two different rules of privilege in the same case, perhaps pertaining to
the testimony of the same witness.
1 69
It is in this context that the American Law Institute has been trying its hand at
writing a formula that will encourage uniformity and consistency. The task of
writing the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to date has taken a
decade. 170 We shall now turn to the Restatement's most recent incarnation.
II. THE RESTATEMENT
The Restatement has chosen the broadest of approaches.1 7 As we shall see, it
opts at least for a subject-matter test, applies the privilege to former officers and
employees, removes at least one of the restrictions of Harper & Row, 17 2 and
expands the concept of "organization" to which the privilege applies. 173 It also
attempts to clarify other issues that logically arise from the use of this privilege,
some of which have little if any development in the case law. 174 Thus, the
Restatement, while furnishing a coherent and complete set of rules that should
assist greatly as this area of the law continues to develop, also adds some new
areas of uncertainty.
Before turning to the issue on which the first part of this paper was largely
focused, it should be noted that the Restatement focuses more broadly than solely
on the corporation. Indeed, section 123 is entitled "Privilege for Organizational
Client," and the term "organization" is used throughout.1 75 Thus, while the case
law to date has arisen almost exclusively in the context of corporations, the
167. FED. R. EvmD. 501.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
169. While beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to attempt to resolve a situation in which,
in one case, a question is asked, the answer to which is privileged as to one claim and yet not privileged as to
another. How is the information to be kept from the finder of fact and given to the finder of fact at the same time?
Does anyone really believe that a limiting instruction would work in such a situation? This issue was noted in
Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 877 (Ariz. 1993), and in Julie Elizabeth Rice, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersection of Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 175, 187.
170. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988).
17 1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
172. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
173. RESTATEMENT § 123.
174. Id. § 123 cmt. e.
175. Id. § 123.
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Restatement recognizes that the principles developed in that context are to be
more widely applied.
Section 123 recognizes that some decisions have questioned whether the
principles developed in the corporate context should be applied beyond that
context. 176 The Restatement brushes aside those questions: "Neither logic nor
principle supports limiting the organizational privilege to the corporate form."177
And comment c goes on to make clear that under the Restatement, the privilege
applies to partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts, estates, "charitable,
social, fraternal, and other non-profit organizations such as labor unions and
chambers of commerce," whether or not incorporated and whether for-profit or
not-for-profit, and to sole proprietorships. 
178
At first blush, this expansive application is startling. Yet, upon analysis, it
makes eminent sense. If a business is undertaken with several principals and
hundreds of employees, what value is satisfied if the attorney-client privilege is to
be applied differently just because the principals chose a partnership form instead
of a corporate form? The difference is truly one of form and not of substance.
Similarly, if a suit is brought against the local cleaning shop with several
employees, and counsel for the cleaning shop discusses the incident with one or
more of those employees who were involved, what value dictates a difference in
the application of the privilege depending on whether the owner had chosen to
incorporate, perhaps solely to obtain the benefits of limited liability, or to remain
a sole proprietorship? None appears. Similar analysis discloses no real difference
between the labor union or fraternal organization that chooses to incorporate and
that which, for all practical purposes, is the mirror image, choosing to remain an
unincorporated association.
Turning now to the question developed in the early part of this paper: To which
constituents of the organization does the privilege apply? The Restatement has
opted for the broadest of views. In its black letter law, section 123 applies the
privilege to a communication by "an agent of the organization" that "concerns a
legal matter of interest to the organization .... ,, 179 This phrasing is at least as
broad as the subject-matter test of Harper & Row180 and Diversified Industries8'
and the functional analysis of Upjohn. 182
The Restatement and these cases apply the privilege to communications that
concern legal matters of interest to the corporation. 183 However, while Harper &
176. Id. § 123 cmt. b.
177. Id. § 123 cmt. b.
178. Id. § 123 cmt. c.
179. Id. § 123(2)-(3).
180. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
181. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
182. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S 383 (1981).
183. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609; Harper & Row, 432 F2d at 491-92.
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Row 18 4 and Diversified Industries85 focus on how the employee acquired the
information and came to speak to the corporation's attorney, the Restatement
simply covers all agents. Thus, the Restatement's main distinction is how the
concept of an agent differs from the "employee" in Harper & Row,186 Diversified
Industries, 1 87 and Upjohn. 188
The Restatement recognizes that there must be balance. On the one hand there
is the attorney's need to know in order to give the best possible advice and to
represent the organizational client as well as possible in either a transactional or a
litigation situation. 8 9 While the Restatement does not address it, on this side is
also weighed the value of the organizational counsel's assistance to the organiza-
tion in voluntary compliance investigations. The Restatement recognizes that, on
the other hand, there is concern that an expansive privilege "afford[s] organiza-
tions 'zones of silence' that would be free of evidentiary scrutiny." 1
90
Recognizing the need for balance, the Restatement opts for a broad application
of the privilege based upon the need of the attorney to know. Thus, when the
black letter of section 123 applies the privilege to communications to counsel by
"an agent of the organization," comment d defines "agent" to "include the
organization's officers and employees," directors, "both when participating in a
meeting of directors and when communicating individually with a lawyer for the
corporation about the corporation's affairs," and "independent contractors with
whom the corporation has a principal-agent relationship," and the agents of those
independent contractors "when acting as subagents of the organizational cli-
ent."'91 Shareholders are excluded from the concept of "agent." 192
As for a partnership, "agent" includes "general partners and employees and
other agents and subagents of the partnership," but excludes limited partners,
who are deemed to be "analogous to shareholders of a corporation." 193 "Agents"
of an unincorporated association for this purpose include officers, employees, and
other contractual agents and subagents, but not mere members, except for small
associations in which "members" function more like partners in a general
partnership.194 An "agent" in a sole proprietorship includes, in addition to the
proprietor, any employee or contractual agent and subagent.'
95
This is a broad sweep, going significantly beyond the law as developed in the
184. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 487.
185. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 596.
186. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 487.
187. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 596.
188. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
189. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. b.
190. Id.







key cases. No case known to this author focuses upon communications between
independent contractors of the organizational client and organizational counsel as
being a part of the organization's attorney-client privilege. Yet, existence of such
privilege makes sense. Currently, many organizations utilize large numbers of
temporary workers, consultants, and sub-contractors. 196 Indeed, it is no longer
rare for a person to be an employee one day and an independent consultant the
next, doing largely the same task for the organization. To limit the privilege to
conversations between organizational counsel and technical employees of the
organization would mean that counsel could not inquire into matters of legal
interest to the organization, under cover of the privilege, from persons who very
well may be the significant actors in the transaction.
The Restatement carries this approach forward when it examines the situation
of the former officer or employee of the organization for example, someone who
is no longer working for the organization because of retirement or other
termination, whether or not voluntary. As the reporter's note to section 123 points
out, 19 7 this issue was raised but not decided in Upjohn,198 and the few decisions
on point are in conflict.199 Consistent with its broad approach, the Restatement,
extends the privilege to "communications with a person with whom the organiza-
tion has terminated, for most other purposes, an agency relationship.
' 200
The Restatement, however, puts on this general rule what may be a significant
qualification - one that clearly will be a point of litigation contention - "a
former agent" is included in the concept of "agent" for privilege purposes "if, at
the time of communicating, the former agent has a continuing legal obligation to the
principal-organization to furnish the information to the organization's lawyer." 20 The
Restatement then refers to the law of agency and the terms of the employment
contract for a determination as to whether there is such a legal obligation.2 °2
Comment e cites and the reporters note quotes the Restatement ofAgency:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts
to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him
and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which
203
can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person.
196. Keith H. Hammonds & Kevin Kelly, Special Report, Business Week, October 17, 1994, at 85.
197. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. e rep. note.
198. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981). Chief Justice Burger, concurring, would have
included the "former employee" in the privilege under the standard that he urged the Court to adopt. Id. at 403.
199. Compare Bobkoski v. Board of Educ. of Cary Consol. School Dist. 26, 141 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
with In re Petroleum Products Anti-Trust, 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum).
200. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. e.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 123 cmt. e rep. note (citing RESTATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY § 381 & cmt. e).
f After termination. An agent may be under a duty to give information to the principal after the
termination of the agency, as where he does not account to the principal until such time. See § 381.
Likewise, if the agency terminates without the fault of the principal, the agent is under a duty
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The reporter's note to section 123 then notes that the Restatement ofAgency:
states a general proposition that a principal is bound .by some forms of
knowledge possessed by an agent, even if the agent does not convey the
knowledge to the principal. It states in Comment e that a principal is bound by
information possessed by an agent who received the information during the
agency but who has terminated the principal-agent relationship before the
consequences of the agent's failure to disclose the information have oc-
curred.2°4
The reporter's note concludes that "it is unclear under those provisions what
the extent may be of an agent's duty to convey information to a former principal,
on the principal's request, if the information would not bind the principal.-
2 0 5
All of this demonstrates that this is one area in which section 123 has not
brought clarity. It is at least arguable that, under section 123, a conversation that
organizational counsel has with a former agent of the organization comes under
the privilege only if: (a) the agency was terminated "without fault of the
principal," and (b) the "form of knowledge" possessed by the agent would
"bind" the principal. One can easily see tangential hearings on motions to
compel and for protective orders into whether the agency terminated with or
without "fault" of the principal, and much dispute about whether the "form of
knowledge" would "bind" the principal. What "form of knowledge" would
"bind" the principal, as well as what is and what is not "fault" of the principal,
may very well .differ from state to state.
To make the situation even worse, section 123, after the reference to agency
law discussed above,20 6 then states:
The privilege covers communications with a lawyer for an organization by a
retired officer of the organization of a matter within the officer's prior
responsibilities that is of legal importance to the organization. 207
Does the separate discussion of the "retired officer", 20 8 after the discussion of
agency law mean that the qualifications noted above do not apply to retired
officers? Does it mean that the privilege applies to any discussion that the
organization's counsel has with a retired officer, whether or not he retired
"without the fault of the principal, 20 9 and whether or not his "forms of
thereafter to give to the principal relevant information received by the agent when acting as such. See
§ 275, Comment e").
204. Id. § 123 cmt. e rep. note (citing RESTATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY § 275).
205. Id.
206. Text accompanying note 204.





knowledge, 210 would bind the organization? And is the situation different if the
officer was terminated or resigned, but did not retire? What is the situation if he or
she retired under duress and protest? Or retired "voluntarily" but under a
Hobson's choice?
It is difficult to imagine a less clear way of presenting the proposition. Instead
of clarity, in this area the Restatement has contributed to, if not created,
murkiness. The only saving thought is that, as the reporter points out, so far there
have been few decisions on point.21 ' But now that the issue has been laid on the
table by the Restatement, one can be certain that the issue will no longer be
ignored.
Returning to the black letter law of section 123, the Restatement states that the
privilege applies if the communication "concerns a legal matter of interest to the
organization." ' 212 This is an area of seeming continuity between the subject-
matter test of Harper & Row,2 13 Diversified Industries214 and the Restatement.
This term is not defined or expounded on in the comments, and it is intended to be
as broad as possible. It excludes only a communication that is not of interest to
the organization, though it is difficult to imagine that any such matter would arise
in litigation.21 5 Therefore, it would seem, any matter raised in litigation would be
"of interest to the organization." As long as a matter is raised, is relevant, or is
material, it will be of interest to the organization. Thus, this language is
effectively without limitation.
Of course, as commentf points out, if the lawyer represents the organization's
agent personally, rather than representing the organization, when he or she
receives the communication, there is a different result.216 No doubt, as commentf
states, "a lawyer representing such an officer or employee ... can have privi-
leged communications with that client. But the privilege will not be that of the
organization."' 21 7 Thus, it is possible that a communication from an agent of the
organization to an attorney who represents that agent personally may be "of
interest to the organization," but because it was made to the attorney in his or her
capacity as counsel for the agent personally it does not fall within the organiza-
tion's privilege. If the attorney for the agent is not also the attorney for the
organization, there is no issue. On the other hand, if the attorney for the agent also
represents the organization and a privileged communication from agent to
210. Id. § 123 cmt. e rep. note.
211. Id.
212. Id. § 123(3).
213. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
214. Diversified Ihdus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
215. The term "litigation" as used here includes analogous situations such as congressional hearings and
administrative proceedings where the privilege may be claimed.
216. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. f.
217. Id.
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attorney becomes "of interest to the organization," it is hard to imagine that there
may not then be an impermissible conflict under Model Rule 1.7.218
While the "legal matter of interest to the organization" easily can be held to be
at least as broad as the subject-matter test, there are two significant differences in
which the Restatement abjures limitations in the key subject matter cases. Harper
& Row2 19 included in the subject-matter test that the "employee makes the
communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation ... ,220 and
Diversified Industries221 included as a requirement that "(2) the employee
making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior
... 222 Finally, in setting forth the relevant factors in arriving at its Upjohn223
decision, the Court started with: "the communications at issue were made by
Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of
11224corporate superiors ....
The Restatement explicitly abandons this requirement, stating in section 123
that, for the privilege to apply, "it is not necessary that a superior organizational
authority specifically direct an agent to communicate with the organization's
lawyer."' 225 Rather, the agent may volunteer information to organization counsel
"when reasonably related to the interests of the organization," and counsel may
"seek relevant information directly from employees and other agents without
prior direction from superior authorities in the organization" and those employ-
ees and agents may respond to such a request.
226
Certainly in this respect, if no other, section 123 provides a broader privilege
than was heretofore thought to exist. Once again, reality supports such a view,
particularly in large organizations. Where a matter comes to the attention of
counsel making an investigation appropriate, it would be wasteful to require that,
before the investigation is undertaken, counsel must first ask the president or, as
in Upjohn, the chair of the board,221 to issue a directive for employees to answer
questions. It also seems unduly formalistic if, when an employee approaches
counsel with some information, counsel must ask him or her to be silent until
counsel obtains a directive that the employee should communicate that informa-
tion to counsel. Thus, the superior-directive restriction of Harper & Row 228
218. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13(d)-(e) cmt. [7].
219. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
220. Id. at 491-92.
221. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
222. Id. at 609.
223. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
224. Id. at 394.
225. RESTATEMENT § 123 cnt. h.
226. Id.
227. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
228. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
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Diversified Industries, 9 and perhaps Upjohn, 3° while having an initial appeal,
is undermined by the practical demands of organizations.
The second limitation of the subject-matter test also is dropped by the
Restatement. For the privilege to apply to a communication from a mere
employee (i.e., one who is not a member of the control group), both Harper &
Row2 3 ' and Diversified Industries232 require that the communication be on a
matter that falls within the duties of that employee.233 Thus, should an office
worker employed by the organization be looking out the window and observe an
accident involving an organization's vehicle, any communication between that
office worker and the organization's counsel concerning that accident would not
be within the organization's attorney-client privilege.
The Restatement rejects that limitation:
Ordinarily, an agent communicating with an organization's lawyer ... will
have acquired the information in the course of the agent's work for the
organization. However, it is not necessary that the communicated information
be so acquired. Thus, a person may communicate... with respect to informa-
tion learned prior to the relationship, or learned outside the person's functions
as an agent, so long as the person bears an agency relationship to the
principal-organization at the time of the communication and the communica-
tion concerns a matter of interest to the organization .... 234
Such an approach, of course, simplifies the resolution of a challenge to the
application of the privilege by eliminating an additional inquiry into the nature of
the employee's duties. It also expands the application of the privilege signifi-
cantly by bringing all employees within the privilege.
The black-letter law of section 123 does restrict the privilege to communica-
tions that are disclosed only to the client, the client's lawyer, agents of the lawyer,
and agents of either "who facilitate communication between them.' '235 Further,
the communication to be privileged can be disclosed to "other agents of the
organization who reasonably need to know of the communication in order to act
for the organization.", 23 6 Comment g makes clear that "those agents include
persons who are responsible for accepting or rejecting a lawyer's advice on
229. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
230. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
231. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 487.
232. Diversified Indus., 572 F2d at 596.
233. Compare Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491 ("[T]he subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties
of his employment.") with Diversified Indus., 572 E 2d at 609 ("IThe subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties.").
234. The only area in which the Restatement abandons this approach has to do with the retired officer: "The
privilege covers communications with a lawyer for an organization of a matter within the officer's prior
responsibilities that is of legal importance to the organization." RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. e.
235. Id. § 123.
236. Id. § 123 cmt. g.
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behalf of the organization or for acting on legal assistance, such as general legal
advice, provided by the lawyer.
' 237
Thus, if the communication is included in a press release, there is no privilege
because the press are not members of the organization nor do they need the
information to act for the organization.238 However, even if the communication is
included in a release to all employees of the organization, there is a privilege if
the lawyer's advice is relevant to all employees in the organization. 239 Anything
less would eliminate the privilege by revealing the communication beyond those
who need to know. However, a privileged communication by counsel to a person
within the organization to whom it is appropriate to send such a communication
may, in turn, be communicated by that person to others within the organization
with the need to know without the privilege being waived.240 Thus, the Restate-
ment provides a simple way to avoid any restriction on the privileged nature of
counsel's legal advice.
The "need to know" is defined to include "all agents of the organization who
would be personally held financially or criminally liable for conduct in the matter
... or who would personally benefit from it."' 24 ' Further, "need to know"
includes those persons "whose general management and supervisory responsibili-
ties include wide areas of organizational activities," specifically including
directors and senior officers of the organization, and to "lower echelon agents of





239. Section 118 of the Restatement provides that the privilege applies to "(1) a communication (2) made
between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for
the client." Id. § 118. Section 119 defines "communication" to include "any expression through which a
privileged person ... undertakes to convey information to another privileged person ..... Id. § 119. Section
120 includes both the client and the attorney as a "privileged person." id. § 120. And section 122 defines
"obtaining or providing legal assistance," as stated in section 118(4), to require that the communication be
"made to or to assist a person: (1) who is a lawyer... and (2) whom the client or prospective client consults for
the purpose of obtaining legal assistance." Id. § 122, 118(4).
Up to section 122, it appears clear that a communication from attorney to client, is within the privilege, as
long as its purpose is to provide legal assistance. Read literally, section 122 appears to limit "obtaining or
providing legal assistance" to a communication to the lawyer. Id. § 122. However, section 119 makes it clear
that the authors of the Restatement intended the privilege to apply to "confidential communications by a lawyer
to a client" without the necessity of showing that the communication "contains or expressly refers to a client
communication." RESTATEMENT § 119 cmt. i. The comment recognizes that there are some decisions that carry
that requirement, but it expressly "reject[s] [them] in favor of a broader rule more likely to assure full and frank
communication ... " Id. The broader rule also will end the practice of counsel adding the formalistic language
"this letter is based upon the confidential communications that you have made to me," ritualistically included
by good counsel to try to ensure the protection of the privilege. It is regrettable that the black-letter language of
section 122 appears in conflict with this position, for that will lead to difficulties as well as inconsistencies in
application.




In so providing, the Restatement spells out a requirement that can be found in
the subject-matter test cases. 243 Moreover, it stands as a rejection of Chief Judge
Campbell's reasoning in Radiant Burners244 that there can be no corporate
attorney-client privilege because of the number of persons within the definition
of "client" who would obtain information that must be confidential for the
privilege to exist. 245 The client, at least for this purpose, seems to be virtually
everybody associated with the organization.
Comment j addresses the issue of who may assert and waive the privilege
belonging to the organization in making the unassailable point that the privilege
"can be asserted and waived only by a responsible person acting for the
organization for this purpose.", 246 The comment also addresses an issue that has
arisen in a few cases: Can an agent or former agent through court order force the
waiver of the organization's privilege where the agent or former agent may have
need for that communication? 247 The reporter's note recognizes that the issue has
come up infrequently, though all are recent cases.248 The comment permits a
tribunal the discretion to order production of such a communication for the
benefit of the agent, if the agent establishes that: (1) "the agent properly came to
know the contents of the communication"; (2) "the agent [has] substantial need.
of the communication"; and (3) "access would create no material risk of
prejudice or embarrassment to the organization beyond such evidential use as the
agent may make of the communication," and even that risk may be ameliorated
by "protective orders, redaction, or other measures.", 249 This balancing of the
interests of the agent and the organization appears to be appropriate, particularly
where the agent generated the document in the first place.
Further, comment k speaks to the problem of succession of the legal control of
the organization, 250 a common occurrence in this day of mergers, acquisitions,
and spinoffs. "[A]s an entity passes to successors, the transaction carries with it
authority concerning asserting or waiving the privilege.",2 5 1 This means that
agents of the acquired organization who had communicated, in confidence, with
attorneys for the acquired organization prior to the acquisition will find that the
successor organization has the ability to claim and waive the privilege as to those
communications. This can become quite crucial in a bankruptcy or receivership
situation, as was demonstrated several years ago when financial institutions were
243. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
244. Radiant Burners I, 207 F. Supp. at 771.
245. Id. at 774.
246. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt.j.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 123 crnt.j rep. note.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 123 cmt. k.
251. Id.
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taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation after those institutions collapsed,
many of which were involved in scandal.252
Finally, comment I provides that inside and outside counsel are to be equated
for the purposes of the privilege.253 This provision follows a long line of cases
that have assumed the equivalency of the two relationships for purposes of the
privilege. 54 Although there have been recent cases that have concluded that the
sometimes overlapping roles of in-house counsel had eliminated the privilege in
a particular instance,255 the Restatement decided not to create any broad excep-
tion to the privilege leaving decisions to case-by-case analysis. The simple logic
of a lawyer is that a lawyer has great appeal in an area already confused by rules
aimed at subtle differences in various relationships. Further, any rule that
discriminated against in-house counsel could easily be avoided, although at some
expense in outside counsel fees and wasted time. The Restatement's authors
clearly have been sensible in this area.
The Restatement's expansive rendition of the attorney-client privilege in the
organizational setting, of course, has its costs. Material collected by an organiza-
tion's counsel from organizational employees will be privileged and not discover-
able by others, whether opposing parties in litigation or governmental agencies
who attempt to enforce statutes and regulations. And when those employees have
"forgotten" the incident or the details of the incident by the time opposing
counsel or government investigators visit with them, justice will be frustrated.
But even this state of affairs presupposes that opposing counsel, or counsel's
agent, is able to talk to such persons at all.
III. No-CONTACT RULE
This section will first explore the history and justifications for a no-contact rule
before examining some of the modem issues that the Restatement tries to resolve.
Finally it will evaluate these efforts and explore some of the new issues that may
be created by the Restatement before concluding that the narrow construction of
the no-contact rule counter balances to some degree the broad attorney-client
privilege.
The ethics of lawyering have long provided that "a lawyer should not in any
way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
252. See Tekni-Plex Inc. v. Tang, 89 N.Y.2d 123 (1996) (concerning conflict of interest issues that developed
out of succession); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, It Pays to be Alert about Unforeseen Conflicts, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
3, 1997, at A19 (discussing similar issues).
253. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt. 1.
254. Id. § 123 cmt. I rep. note.
255. Id; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 561 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff,
483 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
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with him, but should deal only with his counsel."-256 This was the language of
ABA Canon of Professional Ethics 9,257 first adopted in 1908. It was carried
forward into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility258 in 1969 and then
into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.59 Model Rule 4.2, which
is almost identical to that of DR 7-104(A)(1), is as follows: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do
so. 126
0
The Model Rules for the first time dealt explicitly with the organization as a
client. Model Rule 4.2 states:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer
for another person or entity concerning the matter in representation with
persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and
with any other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter
may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or
whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organiza-
261tion.
This formulation has led to many issues on which the courts are split.
2 62
"Having managerial responsibility" is a broad concept and can be applied to
256. MODEL CODE Canon 9.
257. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908.
258. MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1).
259. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
260. MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1). The differences are three. First, DR 7-104(A)(1) provides that the
lawyer shall not "communicate or cause another to communicate .... MODEL CODE Rule DR 7-104 (A)(1).
The "cause another to communicate" language was dropped in Model Rule 4.2, as it is covered by Model Rule
8.4(a). MODEL RULES Rule 4.2, 8.4(a). Secondly, the term "party" in DR 7-104(A)(1), while first used in Model
Rule 4.2 was changed to "person" in 1995. Compare MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 with MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.2 (Discussion Draft 1983). The distinction is that some courts construed
"party" to require that there be actual litigation before either Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) or Model Rule 4.2
had application. Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502 (D. Utah 1996)(applying the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted in 1993, the court ruled: "Rule 4.2 ... only has application
when the communication is with a 'party' which means after litigation has commenced."). The amendment to
"person" made clear that the rule applies outside of the litigation context. See LAWYERS' MAN. PROF. CONDUCT
149, 150 (1995). Third, the heading to DR 7-104 is "Communicating With One of Adverse Interest." MODEL
CODE DR 7-104. Thus, the prohibition of DR 7-104(A)(1) would appear not to apply to direct contact with a
non-adverse party. The heading to Model Rule 4.2 is "Communication With Person Represented by Counsel,"
which clearly makes the rule applicable whenever a person is represented by counsel, whether or not that person
is adverse to the client represented by the lawyer involved in the communication. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
261. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. 4. The comment goes on: "If an agent or employee of the organization is
represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be
sufficient for purposes of this Rule." Id.
262. Benjamin Lloyd Lindquist, Ethical Considerations in Model Rule 4.2's Application to the Corporate
Litigant, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 267, 274 (1996).
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someone who supervises one or more others, or it may be limited to the control
group of the organization.263
The policy reasons behind the no-contact rule is stated in the Model Code in
broad terms:
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason
a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the representation of
his client with a person he knows to be represented in a matter by a lawyer
264
The Restatement presents three reasons: (1) to "protect against overreaching
and deception of non-clients" ;265 (2) to "protect the relationship between the
represented person and that person's lawyer" ;266 and (3) to "assure the confiden-
tiality of the person's communications with the lawyer.", 26
7
From the standpoint of the organization, the no-contact rule serves another
very useful purpose; it "safeguards against the disclosure of information which
[sic] could be used against the [organization] as an admission under either [most
state rules] or the federal rules regarding evidentiary admissions., 268 This
purpose should be viewed in terms of Federal Rule of Evidence, mirrored in the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, that "a statement by a party's agent -or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship," is admissible as against the hearsay rule.269
Thus, it is in the interest of the organization to keep counsel for other parties away
from agents of the organization so that those agents do not furnish to counsel for
other parties statements that can then be admitted in litigation against the
263. Id.
264. MODEL CODE EC 7-18.
265. One court has remarked that the no-contact rule "prevents unprincipled attorneys from exploiting the
disparity in legal skills between attorney and lay people," Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp.
1080, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), and, not so nefariously, "prevents a lawyer from circumventing opposing counsel
to obtain unwise statements from the adversary party." Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621,
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ass'n Bar of City of New York, No. 80-46, 6 (1980)
("[Tihe attorney [if present can] aid his client both to avoid procedural pitfalls and to present truthful statements
in the most favorable manner."); Krulewitch, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1274, 1278 (1988) ("[A]lthough an attorney cannot instruct the client to lie or even distort the truth,
through proper representation, an attomey [who is present at the interview] can ensure that the client uses clear
language to fairly present [his or her] position.").
266. Some courts point out that the no-contact rule prevents an attorney from causing a rift between an
opposing attorney and his or her client. Polycast Tech., 129 F.R.D. at 625; United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F.
Supp. 1430, 1437 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
267. RESTATEMENT § 158 cmt. b.
268. Catherine L. Schaefer, A Suggested Interpretation of Vermont's DR 7-401(A)(1): The Employment
Attorney's Perspective on Contacting Employees of an Adverse Business Organization, 18 VT. L. REv. 95, 98
(1993); see also Benjamin Lloyd Linquist, Ethical Considerations in Model Rule 4.2s Application to the
Corporate Litigant, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 267, 269 (1996).
269. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D); UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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organization, whether or not the organization is able to rebut the statement with
contradictory or impeaching evidence.
However, there are considerations the other way. The Restatement notes that
requiring that conversations be three-way and through counsel for the organiza-
tion is "often more expensive, delayed, and inconvenient than direct communica-
tion," and it "limits client autonomy by requiring that both communication and
consent be through lawyer initiative.", 270 Those reasons are later expanded,
noting that, "under a very broad rule," costs of litigation would be increased, for
the party opposing the organization would be required to obtain information
solely through formal discovery.27' Further, "employees may be unwilling to
speak as freely or candidly at a deposition in the presence of the lawyers for their
employer as in an informal, pretrial interview.", 272 The Restatement calls these
costs "unacceptable" and finds "no justification for permitting one party thus to
control entirely the flow of information to opposing parties.'
2 73
Others have recognized more particularized costs. For example, there is the
following list assembled by one court:
First... the discovery process, formal or informal, should not be unnecessarily
inhibited. Second, ... methods that assist in reducing discovery costs and
providing reasonable alternatives should be supported. Third, ... contempo-
rary litigation is costly and often the "little guy," plaintiff or defendant, is at a
distinct disadvantage in the process. Fourth, in certain types of litigation
against a corporation a pattern of treatment of employees may be critical to
proof of a claim.... Fifth, private litigation is an important means of control-
ling abuses of corporate power and restraining abuses of law.... [Sixth], an
unwise extension of confidentiality restricts access to information and prevents
courts from being fully effective in ferreting out the truth of a disputed claim.
[Seventh], witnesses may be more willing to discuss a matter informally than in
the adversarial context of formal discovery.
274
The Restatement recognizes this conflict of values, but concludes: "Nonethe-
less, the rule is universally followed in American jurisdictions." 275
With these conflicting values, there should be no surprise that the cases, and
the ethics opinions, are split on the issues left unresolved under Model Rule 4.2
and particularly its comment 4, as applied to the organization client.276
Thus faced with conflicting decisions, the Restatement endeavored to clarify




274. Bouge v. Smith's Management Corp., 132 FR.D. 560, 565 (D. Utah 1990).
275. RESTATEMENT § 158 cmt. b.
276. These conflicting cases are noted in the reporter's note to section 159 of the Restatement and in the
literature. Lindquist, supra note 262, at 274.
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the definitional problems of Model Rule 4.2. It begins by stating the general
no-contact proposition in section 158:
(1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person, as defined in § 159, whom the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter .... 277
More importantly, section 159 defines the represented person as follows:
Within the meaning of § 158, a person includes:
(1) a natural person represented by a lawyer; and:
(2) with respect to an organization represented by a lawyer, a person who is
connected with the organization and:
(a) who supervises, directs, or regularly consults with a lawyer represent-
ing the organization concerning the matter or who has power to compro-
mise or settle the matter;
(b) whose acts or omissions may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability in the matter; or
(c) whose statements, under applicable rulefs] of evidence, would have the
effect of binding the organization with respect to proof of the matter.278
This definition differs significantly from Model Rule 4.2, solving most, if not
all, of the identified problems.
Before addressing these issues, however, it should be noted that there is no
definition of "organization" known to the author in Chapter 6 ("Representing
Clients-In General") of the Restatement, and more specifically in Topic Two
("Representing Organizational Clients") of Chapter 6.279 As no general defini-
tion section known to this author has as yet appeared in the Restatement drafts, it
may be assumed that the definition of "organization" in section 123280 applicable
to the attorney-client privilege in the organization setting is applicable through-
out the Restatement. Thus, the discussion of the no-contact rule may be equally
applicable to corporations, partnerships, unincorporated associations, estates,
trusts, and sole proprietorships.2 l
Second, it should be noted that there is no necessary parallelism between
the attorney-client privilege and the no-contact rule. Section 159 states
that "a broad attorney-client privilege for intra-corporate communi-
cations ... does not by itself require a complete ban on contact with
entity employees and agents .... 282 This view is reiterated in section 162.283
277. Exceptions omitted as unnecessary to the current stage of the discussion.
278. RESTATEMENT § 159.
279. Id. at ch. 6.
280. RESTATEMENT § 123 cmt.c.
281. It would be good to have this definitional issue resolved before the Restatement is finally adopted.
282. RESTATEMENT § 159 reporter's note.
283. Id. § 162 cmt. c ("When confidentiality duty does not extend to the subject matter of the confidential
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Upjohn284 supports that view. Justice Rehnquist made it clear that the attorney-
client privilege does not shield the facts themselves from discovery; it
only prevents lawyers from revealing confidences.285 Courts that have cited
Upjohn as a no-contact case, such as Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Superior Court,
2 8 6
are in error.
Section 159's definition improves on Model Rule 4.2 in several ways. It
includes "persons having a managerial responsibility" within the coverage of the
organizational privilege.287 This leads to questions about the meaning of "mana-
gerial responsibility." The Restatement resolves those issues by creating a
functional test: "managerial responsibility" includes a person "who supervises,
directs, or regularly consults" with organization counsel "concerning the matter"
and a person "who has power to compromise or settle to matter."-288 Thus, it
should exclude even high level officers who do not deal directly with the
organization's counsel on the matter, while including relatively low ranking
managers who have the power to settle or compromise. An example is a local
branch manager who has the authority to manage legal matters of a certain type
and a certain size. Thus, a manager's protection is based on his similarity in
function to an individual client.
The reason for this prohibition is that "such persons are likely to have
confidential information concerning the matter, much of which would be immune
from discovery under the attorney-client privilege ... and the work-product
doctrine," and the fear that direct contact by counsel for another party would risk
that the person being communicated with, without counsel for the organization
being present, "would be unable to distinguish between properly discoverable
facts and protected information.", 289 Moreover, protecting these persons from
direct contact "seeks to prevent improvident settlements and impairment of the
relationship of trust and confidence with the lawyer .... ,,29
There are cases under Model Rule 4.2 and Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) that
have construed those provisions along the lines of the Restatement's language.
information itself (as it does extend, for example, to th[at] of trade secrets), the lawyer may inquire into factual
information even though the agent may also have conveyed that information to a lawyer in a confidential
communication. For example, the lawyer may inquire into the same facts the agent discussed in confidence with
the principal's lawyer. However, the lawyer may not seek to examine the agent's copy of correspondence with
such a lawyer or otherwise ask the agent what the agent told a lawyer for the principal.").
284. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
285. Id. at 395 ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of
the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.").
286. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16 (1988).
287. MODEL RuLEs Rule 4.2 cmt. 4.
288. RESTATEMENT § 159.
289. Id. § 159 cmt. c.
290. Id.
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For example, Niesig v. Team 1291 includes "employees implementing the advice
of counsel," among those protected by the no-contact rule,2 92 while In re Opinion
668293 interpreted Model Rule 4.2 to include "those employees trusted with
conducting a suit or claim on behalf of a corporation.,
294
While this functional approach adds some clarity to the definition and is nicely
tailored to the purpose of the ban, there is one serious drawback. The language
"the matter" focuses upon the particular negotiation or litigation. In some
situations, "the matter" may be of such great significance that top organizational
officials deal directly with counsel. In other situations, "the matter" may be
relatively low level, to be handled within the responsibility of a branch manager.
Thus, in different matters the person or persons within the organization who fall
within this prohibition will differ. This potential inconsistency of application
poses an interesting problem for opposing counsel. They will need to ascertain
who in the organization deals with the organization's counsel and who has the
authority to settle or compromise without inadvertently violating the no-contact
rule. This may be easy in some situations, but could be quite difficult in others.
This situation leads to an issue not tackled by the Restatement: Which counsel
has the burden of complying with the no-contact rule? The few cases on point are
split. 295 The Kentucky Supreme Court, for example, held that the defendant
organization had the burden of notifying opposing counsel as to which of
defendant's employees, in its view, fell within the no-contact rule.2 96 The Middle
District of Florida, on the other hand, put that burden on counsel opposing the
organization.297 Given the problems for opposing counsel in identifying exactly
whom would be protected under the Restatement, it seemingly would have made
sense to place at least some burden of disclosure on the organization's attorney in
this matter.
Section 159 places a second group within the no-contact rule: those "whose
acts or omissions may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability in the matter,, 298 language picked up directly from the Model
Rules.299 Section 159 notes that "such a person has acted in the matter on behalf
of the organization and, save for the separate legal character of the organizational
form, would often be directly named as a party in a lawsuit involving the
291. Niesig v. Team 1, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990).
292. Id. at 1035.
293. In re Opinion 668, 663 A.2d 959 (N.J. 1993).
294. Id. at 962-63.
295. Compare K-Mart Corp. v. Helton, 894 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1995) (holding that responsibility falls on the
attorney of those to be contacted) with Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 888 F Supp. 1143 (M. D. Fla.
1995) (holding the burden is on the inquiring lawyer).
296. K-Mart Corp., 894 S.W.2d at 631.
297. Lang, 888 F. Supp. at 1148.
298. RESTATEMENT § 159.
299. MODEL RuLEs Rule 4.2 cmt.4.
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matter.' ' 300 For example, where an organization's truck driver is involved in an
accident that is the basis of the law suit, this provision prohibits counsel for the
other person from contacting the truck driver, whether or not the law suit has been
filed. As comment d points out, this provision applies "even if facts are disputed
concerning the person's actions, such as whether they are properly imputed to the
organization or whether they were the cause of the harm alleged." 30 1 Comment d
indicates that this provision is another attempt to create a functional equivalency
between the individual client and the members of an organization client.
30 2
There are similar problems in section 162. The problem arises where opposing
counsel does not know who is guilty of the act or omission that may be imputed
to the organization and be the basis of a liability. How far can counsel go in
contacting persons in order to explore that issue? For example, where counsel
believes that negligence may have occurred in the operating room, but does not
know who was negligent or even if there had been negligence at all, can counsel
contact those who were there and explore the possibilities? Neither Model Rule
4.2 nor section 159 would seem to prohibit such contact. But once counsel begins
to zero in on a theory based upon the action or inaction of one or more persons,
contact must cease. The interesting question will arise later, when counsel tries to
use a statement obtained from a person whom counsel interviewed prior to
knowing who, if anyone, was negligent. Logically, and analogously to govern-
ment investigation of someone not yet a "target," until counsel has reason to
believe that any employee's action or inaction is the arguable basis of liability of
the organization, the no-contact rule should have no application. However, once
counsel learns enough to have reason to believe otherwise, the contact should
cease. 30 3 Any statements gathered while contact was permissible should be
useable.
While this formulation is logical, the administration probably will be difficult.
The question is how courts will determine whether counsel formed his or her
theory of negligence before, after, or during the relevant interview. Any relevant
internal memoranda or records would be privileged, and courts would be forced
to speculate on when thoughts formed in counsel's mind.
Third, Model Rule 4.2 prohibits counsel for another party from contacting
directly a person within an organization "whose statement may constitute an
admission on the part of the organization., 3° This language has led to inconsis-
tent decisions because the term "admission" has at least two meanings.3 °5 One
300. RESTATEMENT § 159 cmt. d.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. § 159(b).
304. MODEL RuLES Rule 4.2 cmt. 4.
305. Some courts, in administering Model Rule 4.2, have tried to draw bright lines. In Orlowski v.
Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. III. 1996), the court drew a bright line to include
under the no-contact rule all managers except those who were bound by collective bargaining contracts,
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meaning, in line with the pleading admission or an admission under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,306 is binding on a party and takes the issue out of the
case in the sense that contrary evidence will not be admitted.30 7 The other meaning is
that of an evidentiary admission, which can be contradicted or impeached.3 °8
The drafter of Model Rule 4.2 stated that it is the evidentiary admission that
was intended: any statement of "those who can hurt or bind the organization" in
the matter in litigation. 30 9 That categorization, of course, would bring every
employee under the ban, for the statement of any employee, if contrary to the
interests of the organization, could "hurt" the organization. And some courts
have so held.310 Other courts have held that "admission" in Model Rule 4.2 and
the definition of "party" under Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) apply only to a
statement that has such binding effect that contrary or impeaching evidence
would not be admitted.31 l
In its black letter law, section 159 of the Restatement would reject the broader
view of the ban, changing the language to include only those "whose statements,
under the applicable rules of evidence, would have the effect of binding the
organization with respect to proof of the matter."' 312 This provision would be
applicable only to those situations, under hoary doctrines of evidence law "still in
force in some jurisdictions for certain purposes," in which "some agents and
employees have the power to make statements that bind the principal, in the sense
that the principal may not introduce evidence contradicting the binding state-
ment." 31 3 But, "that is not the accepted rule under modem evidence law."314
Another troublesome issue concerns the situation in which an organization, or
its lawyer, instructs employees or agents of the organization not to speak with
opposing counsel.3 15 Such an instruction may be binding upon the agent in that
the organization may discharge or otherwise discipline an agent for breach of the
deciding that the action of those in the latter category could not impute liability to the organization. Similarly, in
a suit brought by female police officers claiming sexual harassment, the court held that police officers above a
certain rank were automatically protected by the no-contact rule. Carter-Herman v. City of Philadelphia, 897 F.
Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Pa. J995). But in K.L. v. Edgar, 945 F. Supp. 167, 169 (N.D. I11. 1996), a suit on behalf of
mental patients, the court held all staff of the institution were within the no-contact rule as the action of any of
them could be imputed to the organization.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
307. Id.
308. FED. R. EvlD. 801(d)(2).
309. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WLLLAM HODES, 2 THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK OF THE
MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr § 4.2:105, at 734 (1994 Supp).
310. Cagguila v. Wyeth Labs, Inc. 127 F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
311. Niesig v. Team 1, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990); Lang v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 1228 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992).
312. RESTATEMENT § 159.
313. Id. § 159 cmt. e.
314. Id.
315. Section 123 defines "agent" for the purpose of the application of the attorney-client privilege to the
corporate client, and does so quite broadly. Id. § 123 cmt. c. As was noted supra notes 222-24, there is no
definition of the term specifically applicable to section 159.
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instruction, but the Restatement does not deem it to be a limitation upon a lawyer
for another party who is seeking evidence.31 6 Thus, a violation by counsel for
another party of this veil of secrecy that the organization is trying to create should
not be the basis of either disqualification or discipline.
A large issue tackled by the Restatement concerns former agents of the
organization. The current law as to agents that have retired, quit, or have been
otherwise terminated is in disarray. Model Rule 4.2 makes no reference to former
officers, employees, or other agents of the organization.31 7 Some courts have read
Model Rule 4.2 to exclude from its no-contact ban any former employee, no
matter his or her former rank or position.318 Other courts have gone in the
opposite direction and applied full no-contact protections to former employ-
ees. 3 19 Still other courts draw a line so as to apply the no-contact rule to those
former employees who held confidential positions, or whose conduct is the
320
subject of litigation in question, or to those former employees who have been
"extensively exposed to confidential information" concerning the matter in
litigation and opposing counsel knows or should reasonably know that fact.
3 2
'
The black letter law of section 159 is of little help, though its use of the present
tense, "a person who is connected with the organization, ' ' 322 could be read to
exclude all former employees from the no-contact rule. However, at least some
former employees are to be included within the ban.323 The example that the Restate-
ment uses, "a former employee who continues regularly to consult about the matter
with a lawyer for the ex-employer," is to be within the ban of section 159.324 This
example also is of little help, for a former employee .who "continues regularly to
consult about the matter" appears to be a present agent for the purpose of that matter.
Help is obtained, however, in section 162, to which comment g of section 159
makes reference. Section 162(2) states the following:
(2) Unless otherwise provided by law, [a] lawyer representing a client in a
matter may not communicate concerning the subject of the representation with
316. Id. § 159 cmt. f.
317. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
318. See The Estate of Mary Schwartz v. H.B.A. Mgmt, Inc., 673 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. App. 1996) (allowing
contact "even where the [former] employee's negligence could be imputed to the party"); Orlowski v.
Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. 111. 1996) ("[F]ormer employees, including former
managers, are not encompassed by Rule 4.2, and may freely engage in communications with Plaintiffs'
counsel."); Fulton v. Lane, 829 P.2d 959, 960 (Okla. 1992) ("[B]ecause former employees may not speak for or
bind the corporation, ex parte communications with former employees are not prohibited."); CAL. R. PROF.
CoNDucr 2-100 (1989) (exempting all former agents or employees from the no-contact rule).
319. See Terra Int'l Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("[Flormer
employees who are ... represented by the former employer's counsel, or any counsel, are.., off limits under
the language of the rules.").
320. Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988).
321. Camden v. State of Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1122 (D. Md. 1996).
322. RESTATEMENT § 159.
323. Id. § 159 cmt. g.
324. Id.
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a person whom the lawyer knows is likely to possess extensive and relevant
trade secrets, confidential client information, or similar legally protected
information of another party interested in the matter that is confidential with
respect to the lawyer's client.32 5
This provision is applicable to "a narrow set of instances: a lawyer must not
communicate at all with an agent or similar person whom the lawyer knows is
likely to have a principal's relevant trade secrets, confidential client information,
or similar confidential information., 326 This concept is further restricted by the
statement that the ban is "generally limited to members of a principal's litigation
team - agents or others retained by a principal as expert witness, expert
consultant.... paralegal assistant, or in a similar capacity.,
327
The examples given in section 162 are a "former employee of an adversary
who, as recently former member of adversary's litigation team possessed exten-
sive confidential information about the matter,",328 "opposing party's non-lawyer
trial assistant,, 329 "lawyer's secretly hired adjuster for opposing party's insurer
with whom lawyer was negotiating settlements, ' 330 and "opposing party's
expert witness." 331 Where a person had less-than-extensive exposure to confiden-
tial information of a principal, such as from dealings with a lawyer, the cases
have refused to apply the no-contact ban to former employees.332 Comment b
makes clear that "confidentiality duties based only on contract are not within the
Section., 333 Thus, it is clear that an organization cannot prevent a lawyer from
talking with former employees simply by including a duty of confidentiality in
those employee's contracts, although speaking with a lawyer for another person
might constitute an actionable breach of contract by the former employee.
The comments to section 162 go on to give various examples: an expert
witness retained by another party to testify or to consult "who, in the course of
that work, has received confidential information," non-lawyer personnel of a law
firm representing an opposing party, a treating physician where a doctor-patient
privilege is in effect, and an attorney for another party when inducing him or her
to violate his or her duty of confidentiality to his or her client.334
Thus, the Restatement has opted for a relatively narrow no-contact rule. Under
the Restatement, counsel is prohibited from contacting solely (1) those persons
325. Id. § 162.
326. Id. § 162 cmt. b.
327. Id.
328. Id. § 162 rep. note (citing MMR/Wallace Power & Indus. v. Thames Assoc., 764 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn.
1991)).
329. Id. (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1937 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
330. Id. (citing Esser v. A. H. Robbins Co., 537 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1982)).
331. Id. (citing County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 271 Cal. Rptr. 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
332. Paul v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Lang v. Superior Court, 826
P.2d 1228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (cited in RESTATEMENT § 162 rep. note).
333. RESTATEMENT § 162 cmt. b.
334. Id. § 162 cmts. g, h.
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who supervise, direct, or regularly consult with counsel concerning the matter or
have the power to compromise or settle the matter; (2) those persons whose acts
or omissions may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
liability in the matter; and (3) those persons whose statements, under the rules of
evidence, would bind the organization so that it could not introduce evidence to
the contrary. The Restatement would bar contact with former employees only in
two very limited situations: (1) where the person is still a consultant as to that
matter; and (2) where the person, when employed, had been a part of the
organization's litigation team and in that capacity had obtained extensive confi-
dential information about the matter. Thus, the Restatement leaves a large area in
which counsel for another party may contact employees of the organization,
though, as is developed above,335 the boundaries of those areas are fraught with
danger.
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
The question remains: How much good does the narrow no-contact rule do
when there is a broad privilege available to the organization and its counsel? The
case stories with which this paper began, Samaritan Foundation336 and Xerox v.
IBM, lead one to be cautious. True, there may be the disgruntled employee and
the whistleblower who at some point and in some form will come forward.3 37 But
those appear to be exceptional situations. It is more likely that employees, out of
loyalty to their organization or out of fear of retaliation, develop selective
memories so that contact with them, either informally or in deposition, is of little
benefit in unfolding their knowledge. While there are no statistical studies to
prove the point, this author believes that the norm is the loyal employee with a
selective memory, and the exception is the person who, when questioned by an
attorney for another party, is willing to put into jeopardy his or her company or
his or her job. That appears to be the lesson of Samaritan Foundation338 and
Xerox v. IBM.3 39 The norm may not be as true, however, among former
employees, who have less to fear and probably less of a basis for continued
loyalty, which certainly would be true of those who were involuntarily separated.
This intuition is borne out by literature available in the social sciences.
Beginning with the seminal work of Professor Solomon E. Asch in the early
335. Text accompanying notes 278 through 326.
336. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
337. See Washington State Physicians v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993) (describing how a loaded
gun, which was not turned over in response to discovery requests, was received by plaintiffs counsel in a plain
envelope with no indication of its sender); Myron Levin, Smoking Gun; The Unlikely Figure Who Rocked the
U.S. Tobacco Industry, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1996, at D-1; (Richard Leiby, Smoking Gun, WASH. POST, June 23,
1996, at F-i).
338. Samaritan Found., 862 P.2d at 870.
339. Xerox Corp. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1997]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
1950s,3 4 ° social sciences explored the influence of group pressure on individual
judgment. A dramatic experiment by Asch illustrates the point. He conducted an
experiment with several college students, none of whom knew each other.3 41 He
asked each, in the presence of the others, to compare the length of a vertical line
with three other lines.34 2 All but one of the students was instructed in advance to
give the same wrong answer, one that was clearly wrong.34 3 The single naive
subject was asked his opinion last: one third of those naive subjects gave the same
obviously wrong answer in the majority of the trials.344 Three quarters were
incorrect in at least one trial. 3 4 5 This experiment clearly demonstrates the force of
group pressure and the need to conform.3 46 Professors Dorwin Cartwright and
Alvin Zander point out that if the pressure to conform was so great when the
subject was giving an opinion among strangers and where there was no overt
social pressure on him or her to conform, "one would surely expect these
pressures to be even stronger in more natural settings and with respect to matters
having greater significance for the participants." 347
Cartwright and Zander conclude that "it is clear that groups can, and often do,
apply pressures on their members so as to bring about a uniformity of beliefs,
attitudes, values, and behavior." 348 They put forth four functions that are served
by such behavior:
(a) to help the group accomplish its goals, (b) to help the group maintain itself
as a group, (c) to help the members develop validity or "reality" for their
opinions, and (d) to help members define their relations to their social
surroundings.
349
To insure conformity, there are rewards and punishment. Rewards include
"indications of esteem and acceptance," such as "school honor rolls, bonus
payments for high production in industry, and awards for good citizenship in the
340. SOLOMON E. AsCH, SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952).
341. Id. at 451.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 454.
344. DoRwiN CARTWRIGHT & ALVIN ZANDER, GROUP DYNAMIcs 139-40 (3d ed. 1968) (providing a full report
of Asch's experiment and his results).
345. Id.
346. Id.; Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN (Harold S. Guetzkow ed., 1951); PHILLIP B. APPLEWHITE, ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 38-41 (1965) (reporting on experiments by several other investigators confirming Asch's results); J.
Richard Hackman, Group Influences on Individuals, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 148-83 (M. Dunnette, ed., 1976); Marilynn B. Brewer & Roderick M. Kramer, The Psychology of
Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior, 36 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1985).
347. CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 344, at 139-40.
348. Id. at 141; APPLEWHrE, supra note 346, at 36-49 (1965) (noting that a group often exerts pressures on
its members to conform to its norms).
349. CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 344, at 142; APPLEwHrm, supra note 346, at 37.
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community. ' 350 Punishments for deviants include "unpleasant consequences"
such as exclusion from the group, or, while not expelled, a lack of respect or
attention to the deviant's ideas or opinions.35 '
As an example of group pressures to conform, Cartwright and Zander refer to a
"commonly observed" example where "members of a work group agree,
perhaps implicitly, on an acceptable rate of production and apply strong pressures
on anyone who dares to deviate from this standard.",352 They go on to quote a
clerical worker's description of what happens when someone deviates from this
standard:
First we would talk about her unfairness among ourselves. If that did not reach
her, we talked about her where she could overhear us. If she still did not change,
one of us would approach her in the lounge and ask her if she was trying to kill
our jobs. That usually did the trick.3 53
They also cite the example, as reported by William S. White, of what happened to
Senator Joseph McCarthy when he fell out of favor with his fellow Senators for
what became more and more clearly deviant behavior and particularly after the
committee investigating him reported unfavorably on his behavior:
Again and again when McCarthy rose to speak there was in the chamber that
rarest of all demonstrations, a demonstration of conscious disorder and inatten-
tion. Tolerance is a long rope here, a very long one. But give a man enough rope
354
Muzafer Sherif examined these principles in terms of perceived threats from
an outside group. While he is mainly concerned with the dynamics of leadership
in such situations, he observes:
When members of a group correctly or incorrectly perceive threat, unjust
treatment, or invasion of their rights by another group, opinion in their group is
consolidated, slogans are formulated, and decisions are made for effective
measures.
355
From his work, Sherif posits certain hypotheses:
1. When members of two groups come into contact with one another in a series
of activities that embody goals which [sic] each urgently desires but which [sic]
can be attained by one group only at the expense of the other, competitive
350. CARTWRIGHT & ZANDER, supra note 344, at 144.
351. Id. at 144-45 (citing SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, Participation in Voluntary Committees (1956) and
Edward E. Sampson & Arlene C. Brandon, The Effects of Role and Opinion Deviation on Small Group
Behavior, 27 SocIoMETRY 261 (1964)).
352. CARTrWIGrr & ZANDER, supra note 344, at 232.
353. Id. at 141.
354. Id. (quoting William S. White, Who Really Runs the Senate? HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Dec. 1966, at 35-40).
355. MUZAFER SuaRIp, IN COMMON PREDICAMENT 13 (1966).
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activity toward the goal changes, over time, into hostility between the groups
and their members.
2. In the course of such competitive interaction toward a goal available only to
one group, unfavorable attitudes and images (stereotypes) of the out-group
come into use and are standardized, placing the out-group at a definite social
distance from the in-group.
3. Conflict between two groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity
within the groups.356
These principles have been applied to the business world in various investiga-
tions. For an extended period, Robert I. Katz observed top management of a
successful medium-sized corporation and concluded, inter alia, the following:
- Identification with the Company. Each of the top executives felt that his
personal reputation, both on the job and among his "outside" friends and
acquaintances, was dependent upon the reputation and performance of the
company - not simply of his own department.
- Penalties for Deviant Behavior. Top management penalized one another,
and men lower in the organization, by withdrawing support, realigning respon-
sibilities, etc., for nonobservance of the norms of consultation, free inter-
change, and sublimation of personal and departmental interests to over-all
company welfare.3 57
Robert K. Merton examined how these principles of social behavior are used
by organizational hierarchy to control the organization by influencing the
behavior of its members.35 8 Merton concluded that the key is "increased
emphasis on the reliability of behavior, i.e., representing a need for accountability
and predictability of behavior," through the "institution of standard operating
procedures and by ensuring that procedures are followed." 359 The consequences
are:
a reduction in personalized relationships (organization members are viewed not
as individuals but as possessors of positions), an increase in the internalization
of rules (procedures take on the positive values initially accruing to the goals
they were designed to achieve), and a narrowing of the range within which
decisions are made (categories for thinking through a problem are decreased).
In turn, and as a result, behavior becomes more rigid, an intense esprit de corps
356. Id. at 81. Sherif reports the results of other investigators, from which he drew various conclusions,
including "Groups [threatened by other groups] closed ranks to pull together cohesively to win; bickering
among members diminished." Id. at 98.
357. Robert I. Katz, Executive Teamword: Top Management Coordination in a Medium-Sized Company
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Business School, 1956, as reported in LAWRENCE ET AL., ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR AND ADMINISTRATION 574-75 (1961).
358. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRucruRE (2d ed. 1957); see also Louis B. Barnes,
Classical Organizational Theory, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND ADMINISTRATION (Paul Lawrence, Louis
Barnes & Jay Lorsch eds., 3d 6d. 1976) (summarizing Morton's work).
359. Barnes, supra note 358, at 504.
[Vol. 10:739
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENT
develops, and a propensity to defend organization members from outside attack
is increased.36 °
A recent work focuses on how these principles are applied in the workplace to
overcome principles of personal morality to do collective harm.3 6 ' Professor
John M. Darley concludes that "through participation in the organization, the
individual has undergone a conversion process and become an autonomous
participant in harmful actions.", 3 6 2 Darley focuses upon "corporate crime,"
which he defines as "crime perpetrated by an organization against either the
general public, that segment of the public that uses the organization's products, or
the organization's own workers." 363 Darley goes on: "A generally accepted
definition of corporate crime, proposed by Marshall Clinard, is 'a form of
collective rule breaking in order to achieve the organizational goals'." 3
Clinard, a seminal figure in the field, encases a critical realization in this
definition, the recognition that some crimes are committed because they fulfill an
organization's goals.",
365
Examples given are: the Ford Pinto, "sold for years by a company in which
many executives were aware that it had a gas tank likely to rupture in low-speed
rear-end crashes and incinerate its passengers"; Robins Corporation, "marketing
a contraceptive product that it knew caused disastrous medical consequences to
many who used it"; Morton Thiokol executives "who were aware of the dangers
to the space shuttle O-rings at low launch temperatures," which resulted in the
Challenger disaster; "defense contractors who have delivered military weapons
systems to the Defense Department with faked safety and effectiveness tests and
substandard internal electronic components"; corporate executives "who contin-
ued to have shipyard workers work with asbestos long after its carcinogenic
properties were known to the officials"; and government executives "who kept
uranium miners at work long after the dangers of that occupation were known to
the bureaucrats." 
36 6
One key to reaching such a result, Darley points out, is diffusion of responsibil-
ity and fragmenting information, so that those who have responsibility can claim
a lack of information and those with information have no responsibility to act on
it. 3 6 7 Unpleasant information, such as information about product dangers, is
abnormal information and thus given no place in the normal flow of information,
360. Id. at 504-05.
361. John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT:
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BusINss ETHics 13 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 15.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 15-16, citing studies of each.
367. Darley, supra note 361, at 17-2 1.
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e.g., that dealing with sales, markets, and profits.368 Thus, those who are able to
act do so with their eyes shut to that which would keep them from the goals of the
organization. As Darley states, "If a product is producing a profit for the
corporation, then one can see a great advantage in the corporation's 'not
knowing' that the product is dangerous when it in fact knows it full well."
3 6 9
Moreover, while persons are assigned formal responsibilities for safety moni-
toring, they "are more informally instructed to disregard those responsibilities, or
simply learn to disregard them under time demands to complete other activities
more directly connected with production.", 370 They are "socialized not to make
the [safety] tests and to fake the record entries about them.",37 1
As a stark example of selective ignorance, Darley refers to a documented
conference between Morton Thiokol engineers and officials and NASA officials
having to do with whether the cold-weather launch of the Challenger shuttle be
scrubbed because of the danger of 0-ring seal failure.37 2 At first the Morton
Thiokol engineers recommended scrubbing, and with such a recommendation the
NASA officials could not authorize the launch.37 3 The NASA officials pressured
the engineers to change their recommendation. 374 The Morton Thiokol personnel
caucused and decided that one of their engineers would change his engineer's hat
to a management hat, and then made a "management decision" to override their
own engineers and recommend the launch.3 75 This is an example of how selective
ignorance works.
When selective ignorance is not enough, there is the threat of punishment.
When production of the Dalkon Shield was to begin at the Robins Corporation
ChapStick plant, Robins was "already aware of several safety concerns" and
"deep in the process of denial and fabrication.' ' 376 The quality control supervisor
at ChapStick, doing the job to which he was assigned, ran some tests and found
that bacteria could enter the sterile uterus through the strings of the Dalkon Shield
device.37 7 When he reported these findings to his superior, his superior " was
anything but pleased" and told him than the strings were not his responsibility. 378
When the quality control supervisor replied that "he could not, in good con-
science, keep quiet about something that he felt could cause infection in the
women who wore the Shield," his superior replied: "Your conscience doesn't
pay your salary," and that "if he valued his job he would do as he was told and
368. Id. at 19.
369. Id. at 18.





375. Id. at 19-20.





forget about the string.", 3 7 9 The quality control supervisor, however, continued to
protest, going over his superior's head. 380 His protests were rebuffed and he was
"let go" in a corporate reorganization some years later.
381
While we can assume that the unhappy consequences of cases such as the Ford
Pinto, Dalkon Shield, and the Challenger O-rings were not intended once the
responsible individuals have knowledge, they are faced with "choosing the least
bad option.", 382 Harm has already occurred. Thus some guilt and liability are
already a reality:
To those responsible ... it must seem that the disastrous outcomes were
foreseeable once evidence for the disasters has accumulated. Some rather
bizarre dynamics ensue. If the organizational decision makers admit, to
themselves and others, that harmful outcomes are actually occurring in the
present, then because it will seem to them that these outcomes were foresee-
able, they will feel culpable for "knowingly" allowing them to happen. And
they will certainly feel that others will think the negative consequences were
foreseeable and condemn them for allowing them to occur. This dynamic
creates a strong pressure for the decision makers to deny that the harmful
outcomes are genuine, or genuinely caused by the product in question.
383
Subordinates may then "interpret that denial as a tacit instruction to lie about
the existence of those harms or minimize the role of the organizational action in
producing them."' 384 Thus, "begins the process of 'the cover-up,' a frequent
occurrence in organizational harm-doing .... 385 Darley states that "organiza-
tional studies give us an enormous number of examples of corporations attempt-
ing to cover up harm-doing." And, he concludes, "there is a great deal of pressure
on" individuals within an organization to cover up.
386
These stories illustrate the point of Darley's study: persons within an organiza-
tion act for the good of the organization. Those who get tempted to act in
accordance with their individual consciences are faced with punishment; and
once involved, it is very difficult to extricate oneself, and "almost instinctively,
one conceals evidence of disasters from outsiders, out of loyalty to one's
co-workers .. ,,387
Based upon this research, it is quite clear that the psychological drive to
conform to what appears to be best for the organization, and the drive to cover up
wrongful acts, would carry forth to those instances in which employees of the
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 17, 24.
382. Id. at 26.




387. Id. at 31.
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organization are questioned by counsel for some party in opposition to the organization,
an out-group that threatens the organization to some greater or lesser extent.
V. CONCLUSION
The literature and research of social psychology support the intuitive conclu-
sion that Samaritan Foundation388 and Xerox v. IBM389 do not represent the
unusual. Thus, the chances of current employees of an organization cooperating
with opposing counsel, even in depositions, to reveal the truth of what happened
are slim, except, of course, for the person who is willing to be expelled from the
group (i.e., fired) for the sake of his or her own conscience. Those are the
exceptional people, and the history of what happens to them is too well known to
be ignored except by the most courageous or foolhardy. While it is good to have a
narrow no-contact rule, which permits counsel for other parties to interview more
employees or an organizational party than would otherwise be the case, one needs
to have his or her head in the sand to believe that this will be of any significant
value, save for the exceptional situation.
Consideration must then be given to the purpose of the litigation system: to
approach the truth and thus do justice in accordance with the truth,39° or to play
those litigation games that hide the truth. If it be the latter, then of course the
obstacles to truth seeking are in themselves of value. If it be the former, then there
must be a value justification for each obstacle to truth finding.
This is not the place to question the values behind the attorney-client privilege,
which this author happens to believe strongly support its truth-hiding conse-
quences. But it is the place to question whether the harmful extension of that
privilege worked by the Supreme Court in Upjohn391 is justified by the benefit to
be obtained. Clearly the Upjohn rule, when weighed in the reality of employee
action and reaction, does much to hide the truth, no matter the breadth of the
no-contact rule.
Upjohn3 92 makes sense, at most, in the context in which it was decided: to
encourage an honest internal audit of the organization when a violation of public
law is suspected and, through the audit, correct its ways. Even this justification is
suspect, however, as organizations also are driven to this result by lessened
penalties for conducting such audits and enhanced penalties for not having an
audit apparatus in place.393
388. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
389. Xerox Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
390. See Washington State Physicians v. Fisions Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993) (imposing sanctions for
less than full disclosure, discarding the argument that it was common practice in the industry).
391. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
392. Id.
393. See JEFFERY M. KAPLAN, JosEPH E. MuRPHY & WIn-Top M. SwENsoN, CoawuANcE PROGRAMS AND THE
CORPORATE SENTENCING Guml uNEs: PREVENTING CRiAL AND CIvIL LIABIrrY § 4:01 (1997) (outlining the many
advantages of internal compliance programs and self reporting under Chapter Eight of the United States
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As far as Upjohn394 is applied beyond that context, its justification is of course
much diminished, and, in this author's view, its justification is overridden by its
costs. Those costs are demonstrated in Samaritan Foundation.3 95 If the attorney-
client privilege had been applied to bar the uncovering of the statements given to
counsel, truth would have been successfully hidden (at least to that extent), and
injustice would have occurred. And, as the social psychology literature demon-
strates, that is the norm with which we must live.
The ALI is now proposing, through the Restatement, that the Upjohn396 rule
become universal among the states. It is not too much to imagine how this
became a part of the Restatement. The ALl was once thought of, perhaps naively,
as an objective, disinterested body of 3,000 leading law professors, judges, and
private practitioners who left their clients outside and struggled for a restatement
of the law based upon their own consciousness of what the law is, or should be in
the sense of what is right. If that were ever true, it is clearly not true today. The
lobbying of insurance-industry lawyers to shape the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers in accordance with the interest of their clients was both open
and shameless.39 7 The article that reported this situation brought a response that
all that was done by the insurance industry was asking the reporters to consider
some alternatives and to urge that the ALI process be opened up to more of such
lobbying efforts. 3 98 This author, a member of the ALl, can report that he received
directly three letters from "old friends" he had not seen in decades who were now
insurance counsel, urging him to vote in accordance with their views. In this
light, one may suspect the result reached in section 123 as being less than clearly
disinterested.
Thus, it is this author's view that the no-contact rule adopted in the Restate-
ment is to be commended as far as it attempts to be narrow, but that the total
picture that emerges from the Restatement is to be regretted in view of reality. By
adopting Upjohn399 beyond its context, the Restatement acts to help truth-hiding,
not truth-finding. It is hoped that state courts, as they consider whether to adopt
and follow the Restatement, realize that Upjohn4° ° applied beyond its context
leads to injustice and in so realizing, reject section 123 of the Restatement as it is
written.
Sentencing Guidelines). Even more, the justification of the Supreme Court is itself suspect. Karen Donovan,
Ethics for 'Independent' Probes: Can Lawyers Serve as Both Disterested Fact Finders and Advocates for
Clients?, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, July 14, 1997, at Al.
394. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
395. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
396. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
397. See Jonathan Groner, Insurance Lobby Aims at Normally Staid ALI, LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1996, at 1
(reporting the wide range of lobbying techniques used on the ALI in their drafting of Restatement of Law
Governing Lawyers).
398. William T. Barker, Insurers Weren't Only Ones Lobbying AL, LEGAL "tMEs, June 24, 1996, at 26.
399. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
400. Id.
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